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INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE 
Several of the Member States of the European Union (EU) include 
overseas regions and territories lying thousands of kilometres away from 
Brussels. These territories enjoy a wide array of diverse legal statuses 
governing their position vis-à-vis EU law and seem to have one thing in 
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Dominique Custos (New Orleans), Prof. Jacques Ziller (Pavia), Harry Panagopoulos, 
Melania Tudoric  and Kolia Kuraha (†) for their help. This is a profoundly updated overview 
of the EU Law of the Overseas which builds on my earlier article in this Journal entitled 
Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas 
Possessions of European Union Member States, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 195 (2008). This 
update became necessary with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has 
profoundly reshuffled the previous legal regime applicable to the EU’s Overseas. An earlier 
version of this text appeared in my edited volume EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS: OUTERMOST 
REGIONS, ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, TERRIORIES SUI GENERIS 
(2011) many thanks to Karel van der Linde, of Kluwer Law International for the permission 
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common: the functioning of national and European law in these areas is 
highly atypical compared with Europe. Just as it is unusual, the legal 
situation of such territories is highly acute, as millions of Britons, 
Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Danes, Spaniards and Portuguese permanently 
reside in the overseas parts of their Member States, providing a vivid 
reminder of the immediate colonial past.1 These people, like the 
innumerable companies registered in such territories, often find themselves 
in a difficult position, as it is sometimes virtually impossible to answer the 
simplest of possible questions: which law should apply? While the 
implications of the specific legal position of the overseas regions and 
territories under the sovereignty or control of the EU Member States for the 
interaction between the legal orders of municipal, European, and 
international law are extremely far-reaching, they remain dangerously 
under-researched. In fact, some of the more obscure overseas regions seem 
to exist in a kind of legal limbo. 
This contribution aims at outlining the foundations of the “EU law of the 
Overseas,” following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 
presenting a selection of the key legal issues arising in the application of EU 
law to the Member State territories lying far away from the European 
continent, as well as placing such territories in the general context of the 
development of European integration, giving them the attention they 
deserve.  
However controversial the term “territory”2 might sound when applied to 
the EU, to deny the fact that such a thing exists would be unwise.3 Clearly, 
  
 1. For the land area and population of such overseas territories and regions, see 
Tables 1–3. Some such territories, enormous in size, cannot boast any population at all, 
however, which does not prevent them from having a Prefet/Administrateur supérieur and a 
philatelic commission. See, e.g., A. Oraison, Le statut des Terres australes et antarctiques 
françaises à la lumière de l’article additionnel 72-3 de la Constitution, 22 REVUE FRANÇAISE 
DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 681 (2006). 
 2. On the meaning of “territory” in public international law, see, for example, 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-62 (2003); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-67 (6th ed. 2003). 
 3. The literature on the territorial scope of EU law usually starts with the 
assumption of the inapplicability of the notion of “territory” to the Union, only to proceed to 
the scope ratione loci later, which is a very narrow approach to the issue. See, e.g., Jacques 
Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 38 VICTORIA 
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 51 (2007); V. Coussirat-Coustère, Article 227, in V. Constantinesco 
et al. (eds.), TRAITÉ INSTUTUANT LA CEE: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1419, 1420 
(1995). See also L. Burgorgue-Larsen, L’identité de l’Union européenne au cœur d’une 
controverse territoriale tricentenaire: Quand le statut de Gibraltar réapparaît sur la scène 
judiciaire européenne, 43 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 25, 39-42 (2007); J. 
Groux, “Territorialité” et droit communautaire, 23 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 1, 5-33 (1987). In earlier publications, I shared this perspective, arguing that 
“instead of speaking of a territory of the EU . . . it is necessary to speak separately about the 
territorial scope of application of the most important component parts of EU law.” Dimitry 
Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues of Application of European Law in the 
Overseas Possessions of the Member States of the European Union, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
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EU law applies across a certain number of square kilometres.4 Moreover, 
although one can speak about a number of different “territories” within the 
Union, depending on what one has in mind,5 the main principle here is 
  
195, 203 (2008). In light of the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, this approach 
does not seem sustainable any more. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306) 1, the word “territory” should enter EU terminology without innumerable far-reaching 
derogations. 
 4. 4,324,782 km sq. (the European part). 
 5. The customs territory of the Union does not overlap with the Schengen territory. 
The Schengen provisions, although forming part of the acquis for all Member States except 
the UK and Ireland and enjoying a special status in Denmark, apply to EEA States and 
Switzerland, although not in full in some new Union Member States such as Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Cyprus. Moreover, the overseas parts of the Member States are also excluded 
from the application of the Schengen system by the Schengen Convention. See Council 
Regulation 2913/92, Establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (as 
amended); Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common 
Borders, of the Schengen Acquis, of 14 June 1985, art. 138, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19. For a 
meticulous analysis of the customs territory, see, for example, LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, EU 
LAW OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND CUSTOMS UNION (2009). France appended a special 
declaration to the Treaty of Amsterdam when the rules of the Convention were moved to 
what used to be the First Pillar of the Union. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty 
on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain 
Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1; Declaration by France Concerning the 
Situation of the Overseas Departments in the Light of the Protocol Integrating the Schengen 
Acquis into the Framework of the European Union, appended to Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 144. For a general 
analysis see, for example, RUBEN ZAIOTTI, CULTURES OF BORDER CONTROL: SCHENGEN AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN FRONTIERS (2011). The territorial scope of application of both 
aforementioned “territories” does not overlap with the scope ratione loci of the secondary 
law on turn-over taxation, whose territorial scope of application is similar to that of the 
Community Customs Code and differs from the text of Article 355 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
See Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the Harmonization of the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Turnover Taxes-Common System of Value Added Tax: 
Uniform Basis of Assessment., 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 (as amended). See also Case C-283/84, 
Trans Tirreno Express SpA v. Ufficio provinciale IVA, 1986 E.C.R. 231 ¶ 20. On the issue 
of the territorial scope of the EMU and the Euro, see Fabian Amtenbrink, EMU and the 
Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS: OUTERMOST REGIONS, ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS 
COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, TERRIORIES SUI GENERIS 271 (Dimitry Kochenov ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS]. For a discussion of the statistical territory of the 
Community, see Council Regulation 1172/95, On the Statistics Relating to the Trading of 
Goods by the Community and Its Member States with Non-member Countries of 22 May 
1995, art. 3, O.J. (L 118) 10 (EC). To illustrate the differences, see Council Regulation 
476/97 of 13 March 1997, art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 075) 1 (EC), amending with respect to 
statistical territory Council Regulation 1172/95. Council Regulation 476/97 included the 
Island of Helgoland, which is outside the Customs territory, into the statistical territory of the 
Community. More importantly, Eurostat strangely does not include the French Overseas 
 
672 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
absolutely clear. As restated in Article 52(1) of the Treaty on the European 
Union (EU Treaty),6 EU law applies in the territory of all the Member 
States.7 Most recent case law of the Court of Justice the European Union 
(ECJ) supports the importance of territory.8 This concept came to play a 
fundamental role in the framing of the Court’s jurisdiction in EU citizenship 
cases. 
Although the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)9 are independent instruments having “the same 
legal value,”10 the fact that Article 52 TEU makes a reference to “[t]he 
Treaties” and entrusts Article 355 TFEU with the task of supplying lex 
  
Departments (DOM) in the territory of France as a Member State of the European Union. 
Fabien Brial, La place des régions ultrapériphériques au sein de l’Union européenne, 1998 
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 639, 641 n.9. With regard to a number of other fields of law, 
numerous variations abound. Particularly unclear is the understanding of EU territory for the 
purposes of EU criminal law and EU external action. See, for an analysis, Maria Fletcher, EU 
Crime and Policing and the OCTs, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra, at 291; Steven 
Blockmans, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? Conflicts in External Action Pursued 
by OCTs and the EU, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra, at 307; Kochenov, supra note 3, 
at 217–21. 
 6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 52(1), Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 7. Article 52(1) of the TEU reads as follows:  
The Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian 
Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the 
Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Problems might arise, however, when it is not absolutely clear what the meaning of a 
“Member State” is. That the issue is not purely hypothetical follows, for instance, from the 
legal questions Professor Monica Claes was asked by the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations which included, “welke entiteit moet als lidstaat van de Europese 
Unie worden beschouwd: Nederland of het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden?”, i.e., the Dutch 
government did not know what a “Member State” is, even in the context of its own country. 
For Professor Claes’s answers, see Monica Claes, Europees-rechtelijke aspecten van 
kiesrecht van Nederlandse onderdanen die in de Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn (2010) 
(Ticom Paper, Tilburg University). 
 8. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 609J0034 (Mar. 8, 2011); Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I-00000. For analysis, see Dimitry Kochenov, A Real European 
Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in 
Europe, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55 (2011). 
 9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 10. TEU, supra note 6, Art. 1(2). 
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specialis to accompany the lex generalis provision contained in the EU 
Treaty, unequivocally indicates that both Article 52 TEU and the relevant 
TFEU instruments are equally applicable to both Treaties, which had not 
been the case before Lisbon, when each of the Treaties in force had its own 
scope ratione loci,11 not identical to other Treaties, albeit applicable to the 
same Member States. 
  
 11. The founding Treaties formed a united system of law, since it was impossible to 
join one of the three Communities without joining the two others, just as joining the Union 
was impossible without joining the constituent Communities. This unity had started to take 
shape at least since the entry into force of the Merger Treaty. Treaty Establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 J.O. 
(152) 1 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]. See also JIM CLOOS, LE TRAITÉ DE MAASTRICHT: 
GENÈSE, ANALYSE, COMMENTAIRES 131 (2d. ed. 1994). Moreover, the single provision to 
regulate the enlargements of the Communities and the Union has been in place since 
Maastricht. Treaty on European Union art. 49, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5. 
  Nevertheless, the founding Treaties recognised a sophisticated regime for 
differentiation in their ratione loci. Therefore, while the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSC) only applied to the European territory of the Member States, the 
situation with European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Euratom) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was drastically different, as both of them approached the 
territorial scope of application of the law differently from the ECSC. See Treaty Establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community art. 79, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 
[hereinafter Eurotom Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
  The Euratom Treaty is much more inclusive due to the common European 
interests in the uranium deposits of the former colonies that existed at the time of its 
negotiation. See Dominique Custos, Implications of the European Integration for the 
Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 91. Consequently, according to 
Article 198 of Euratom, the Treaty applies to the European territory of the Member States 
and “to the non-European territories within their jurisdiction.” Eurotom Treaty, art. 198. 
Exceptions are only made for the Færœ Islands, Greenland and the UK Sovereign Bases on 
Cyprus. A special regime applies to the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. All in all, it is 
clear that the inclusive approach to territory demonstrated by Euratom lost much of its force 
upon the gaining of independence of the African colonies rich in the relevant resources. 
Coupled with the “principle of speciality,” which necessarily limits the scope of issues that 
can be addressed via the Euratom framework, the relevance of this Community, which has 
survived the Lisbon reshuffle, to the overseas regions of the Member States remains very 
limited indeed. 
 
  As for the European Economic Community Treaty, it introduced several classes 
of territories in its law, with varied application of the Treaty provisions in each. This system 
of ratione loci variation, entirely different from the ECSC, which embraced the general 
principle of exclusion, and the Euratom Treaty, which embraced the general principle of 
inclusion, can be placed between the two. It laid the foundations of the current system of 
ratione loci of the law of the EU analysed below. 
  As for the pre-Lisbon version of the EU Treaty, there was no consensus in the 
literature or among the practitioners as to how the law is to apply. Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. Most notably, the EC Treaty did not contain any provisions at all 
that would specify the extent of its territorial scope. Thus it provided an example of an 
approach to the definition of such scope that is different from the three other treaties then in 
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In other words, EU territory seems at first glance to represent a 
mathematical sum of the territories of the Member States with EU law 
equally applying to the entirety of the territory of the Member States, 
including their territorial waters12 and “ships and aircraft under the rules of 
the flag.”13 To adhere blindly to this simple statement, although generally 
correct, would be to oversimplify the issue of territorial application of EU 
law to an almost dangerous degree. Indeed, EU law applies very differently 
to Campione d’Italia, the Holy Mount Athos, the municipality of Budapest, 
the double kingdom of Wallis-et-Futuna within the French Republic, 
Martinique, or the Island of Bonaire. Interestingly, although all the 
territories mentioned are clearly parts of Member States, the application of 
EU law in each is far from identical.14 
It is possible, in this regard, to distinguish between a classical model of 
application of EU law, consisting of the full application of the acquis15 to 
the whole territory of the Member States as understood in the national 
Constitution16 and where the principle of the “unitary concept of territory”17 
  
force. This sparked academic debate, notwithstanding the basic rule of the Vienna 
Convention in the Law of Treaties art. 29, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. This treaty 
stated in Article 29 that treaty law applies to the entire territory of each party, and thus binds 
the whole territories of the member states. Id. For an outline of this debate see Kochenov, 
supra note 3, at 216, 217-23. For contemporary implications and analyses, see the views 
expressed by Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and 
Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra 
note 5, at 69; Morten Broberg, Access to the European Court of Justice by Courts in 
Overseas Countries and Territories, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, at 137; Fletcher, supra 
note 5, at 291; Steven Blockmans, supra note 5. On the territorial scope of the founding 
Treaties see, for example, Jacques Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: 
Diversity and Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ 
Territories, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? 113, 
115 (Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000); Kochenov, supra note 3, at 204-17. It is 
unavoidable that the contributors to this book will be constantly returning to the issue of the 
historical evolution of the scopes ratione loci of the founding Treaties, which is fundamental 
to this study.  
 12. Case 61/77, Commission v. Ireland, 1978 E.C.R. 417; Case 63/83, Regina v. 
Kent Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. 2689. 
 13. See DAVID VAUGHAN, VAUGHAN LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES SERVICE 
¶ 643 (David Vaughan ed., Issue 34, 1990). 
 14. The variation in the application of EU law in the overseas regions and territories 
of the Member States should be viewed in the right context, providing yet another example 
of differentiation in the application of EU law, of which numerous examples are known. For 
an analysis of this general contest see, for example, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: 
FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY?, supra note 11. 
 15. For a general analysis of the term, see Christine Delcourt, The Acquis 
Communautaire: Has the Concept Had Its Day?, 38 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 829 (2001). 
 16. The ECJ respects the Member States’ own approaches to territory. For a concrete 
reference see, for example, Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt de Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. In some cases Member States tried to 
challenge the inclusive vision of territory and national institutional structure embraced by the 
ECJ vis-à-vis other Member States, but to no avail. See e.g., the British position in Joined 
cases C-100/89 and 101/89 Kaefer v. French state 1990 E.C.R. 4647 ¶¶ 6, 7. The British 
 
2012] The Application of EU Law 675 
 
applies (i.e. the main rule);18 as opposed to the model where EU law does 
not fully apply to certain parts of Member State territory, i.e. where the 
unitary idea of territory is not applicable and differentiation is the key word. 
In the territories covered by the second model, EU law “s’applique fort 
imparfaitement,”19 and to a varying degree—thus introducing concentric 
circles of EU involvement with different parts of Member States’ 
territories,20 especially in the so-called “borderland Europe”21 at times lying 
many time-zones away from the European part of the EU (i.e. the exception 
to the main rule). It is abundantly clear at this point that for some Member 
States “il n’y a pas coïncidence complète entre territoire national et territoire 
d’application du droit communautaire.”22 
While the main principle that EU law applies in full is true for virtually 
all the European territory of the EU,23 minor exceptions notwithstanding,24 
  
government submitted that a Polynesian court could not be regarded as a “court or tribunal of 
a Member State” in the sense of Art. 267 TFEU (then Art. 234 EC), an argument which 
failed to convince the Court. See also Broberg, supra note 11, at 137. Interestingly, AG 
Mischo, writing privately, was surprised that only one government made such an argument. 
J. Mischo, The Competence of the Judiciary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba to 
Request Preliminary Rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1991 
TIJDSCHTIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT—JUSTICIA, 140, 142. 
 17. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 379. Speaking about prohibitions on 
imports of goods justified on the grounds of public morality, the Court underlined that “the 
fact that certain differences exist between the laws enforced in the different constituent parts 
of a Member State does not thereby prevent that state from applying a unitary concept [of 
territory].” Id. ¶ 16. 
 18. TEU art. 52. 
 19. Syméon Karagiannis, A propos du règlement des conflits d’intérêts entre les 
territoires dépendant d’Etats membres et les Communautés européennes, 75 REVUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE 330, 337 (1998). 
 20. Karis Muller, “Concentric Circles” of the Periphery of the European Union, 48 
AUSTRALIAN J. POL. & HIST. 322 (2002); Morten Broberg, The EU’s Legal Ties with Its 
Former Colonies: When Old Love Never Dies? DIIS Working Paper, 2010.  
 21. See Teresa Pullano, Restructuring Europe from its Margins, in EU LAW OF THE 
OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 363, 364. 
 22. Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 333. 
 23. The meaning of the reference to the Member States in Article 52 of the TEU is to 
be interpreted in the most inclusive manner. Therefore, unless some lex specialis provisions 
in the Treaty are applicable, the principle of the unitary approach to territory reigns. Case 
34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 3813, ¶ 6. 
 24. For such exceptions, see Council Regulation 2913/92, Establishing the 
Community Customs Code, art. 3(2), 1992 O.J. (L 302) 3 (EEC). The regulation lists all the 
territories that are outside the territory of the Member States, but are still considered part of 
the Community customs territory. Id. The consequences of such inclusion are far-reaching 
because the Customs Union is at the core of the Internal Market, and the preamble of Council 
Regulation states that the Community is “based upon a customs union.” Id. at pmbl. Such 
territories include Melilla, Ceuta, the Island of Heligoland, Buesingen, Livigno, Campione 
d’Italia. Council Regulation 2913/92, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (EEC). The reverse is also 
possible: a third country can be part of the customs territory of the EU while not being a 
Member State, as the examples from the past relations between the EEC and Monaco and 
between the EEC and San Marino have demonstrated. Council Regulation 2913/92, arts. 
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the largest share of the Member State territories lying outside of Europe—
some of them not formally forming part of the particular Member State 
while clearly under its sovereignty25—provides examples of legal 
arrangements deviating from the main rule of Article 52(1) TEU. 
Unsurprisingly, such deviations are unequivocally authorised by the 
Treaties—Article 52(2) TEU contains a reference to Article 355 TFEU, 
where such rules are spelled out—and which form a complex system of 
rules.  
The fact is that millions of EU citizens residing in what is considered 
Member State territory, find themselves in areas which either do not fall 
within the scope ratione loci of EU law entirely, or where EU law applies 
with serious derogations. This situation is prone to generate confusion and 
occlude clarity, unless addressed by experts in sufficient detail. In the 
English-speaking world the latter has not been done at any serious level 
until the publication of the volume on EU Law of the Overseas26 edited by 
the author,27 on an extract from which this contribution is based. Stunningly, 
  
3(2)(b) & 3(2)(c), 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (now obsolete). Some other examples of European 
Member State territories where EU law does not apply in full or applies with serious 
derogations include the Holy Mount Athos, the Åland Islands, the Nordic territories 
inhabited by Sami people, and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, which are mentioned 
above in the category of territories sui generis. See Documents Concerning the Accession of 
the Hellenic Republic to the European Communities, Joint Declaration Concerning Mount 
Athos, 1979 O.J. (L 291) 186 [hereinafter Declaration on Mount Athos]; TFEU, arts. 355(4) 
& 355(5)(c); Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is Founded, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 9; 
Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland, and Sweden: Protocol No. 3 On the Sami People, 
1994 O.J. (C 241) 352. 
 25. Which is the case with the numerous overseas territories connected with the U.K. 
IAN HENDRY & SUSAN DICKINSON, BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES LAW 2 (2011). 
 26. See generally EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS: OUTERMOST REGIONS, ASSOCIATED 
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, TERRITORIES SUI GENERIS (Dimitry Kochenov ed., 
2011). 
 27. For rare exceptions in English, see, for example, Ziller, supra note 3, and 
Kochenov, supra note 3. See, e.g., Dimitry Kochenov et al., De caribische 
koninkrijksgebieden en de Europese Unie: Over de status van UPG en LGO naar Europees 
recht, 26 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT-JUSTICIA 10 (2010); Danielle Perrot, Les 
régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT EUROPÉEN 717 (2009) [hereinafter Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises 
selon le traité de Lisbonne]; Isabelle Vestris, Le statut communautaire des régions 
ultrapériphériques, la construction d’un modèle attractif et perfectible d’intégration 
différenciée (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the French Antilles and 
Guiana) (on file with author) (French West Indies); H.E. Bröring ET AL., SCHURENDE 
RECHTSORDES: OVER DE EUROPESE UNIE, HET KONINKRIJK EN ZIJN CARIBISCHE GEBIEDEN 
(2008); UNION EUROPÉENNE ET OUTRE-MERS, UNIS DANS LEUR DIVERSITÉ (L. Tesoka & J. 
Ziller eds., 2008); H. Béringer, Outre-mer, JURISCLASSEUR FASCICULE 456 (2006); Jacques 
Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, 113 POUVOIRS 145 (2005); Jacques Ziller, The 
European Union and Overseas Territories, 113 POUVOIRS145 (2005); Jacques Ziller, Les 
outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la mondialisation—L’association des pays et 
territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté européenne, 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE 
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in numerous cases it was even impossible to state with any degree of 
certainty whether and what kind of EU law applies in a certain territory, to 
which numerous academic debates28 as well as the obvious errors made by 
the Commission in its policy documents29 overwhelmingly testify. 
Some elements of the acquis apply to the overseas parts of the territory 
of one Member State while being deemed inapplicable to the parts with 
identical EU law status connected with other Member States.30 In other 
words, the general confusion is not the only problem once the scope of 
application ratione loci of EU law is analyzed. The current state of affairs 
has led to the loss of the general uniformity in the application of EU law in 
the overseas parts of the Member States predominantly lying outside 
Europe. Consequently, although rules abound and every opportunity to 
introduce clarity into the picture seems to be present, the situation—where 
EU law supposedly applies in the Member States’ non-European 
territories—is far from clear. This article makes an attempt to remedy this 
gap. 
  
D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 127 (2002); Arjen van Rijn, Brussel, Den Haag en de landen 
en gebieden overzee: Problemen en perspectieven [Brussels, the Hague and the Overseas 
Countries and Territories: Problems and Prospectives], in ONZE KEUS: PIROUETTES IN HET 
GEMEERSCHAPSRECHT 126 (Rolf de Groot et al. eds., 2001) (Neth.); LA SOUVERAINETÉ 
PARTAGÉE EN NOUVELLE CALÉDONIE ET EN DROIT COMPARÉ (Jean-Yves Faberon & Guy 
Agniel eds., 2000); Danielle Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 paragraphe 2 du traité instituant 
la Communauté Européenne: Vers un approfondissement de la différenciation juridique en 
faveur des régions ultra-périphériques, 12 POUVOIRS DANS LA CARAÏBE 111 (2000) ; Jean-
Pierre Puissochet, Aux confins de la Communauté européenne: les régions 
ultrapériphériques, in MELANGES EN HOMMAGE À FERNAND SCHOCKWEILER 491 (Gil Carlos 
Rodríguez Iglesias et al. eds., 1999); Brial, supra note 5, at 639; Ismaël I. Omarjee, Le traité 
d’Amsterdam et l’avenir de la politique de différenciation en faveur des départements 
français d’outre-mer, 34 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 515 (1998); 
Karagiannis, supra note 19; JACQUES ZILLER, LES DOM-TOM (2d ed. 1996); Elisha Paulin & 
Marie Josèphe Rigobert, Les régions ultrapériphériques et la CEE, REVUE DU MARCHÉ 
COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE, 436 (1993); Groux, supra note 3. See also Fiona 
Murray, The European Union and the Member State Territories: A New Legal Framework 
under the EU Treaties (2012) (Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University of Rotterdam).  
 28. For a short summary see, for example, Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–20. 
 29. See Commission Green Paper on the Future Relations Between the EU and the 
Overseas Countries and Territories, at 6, COM (2008) 383 final (June 25, 2008) [hereinafter 
Commission Green Paper](wrongly denying EU free movement rights to the residents of one 
group of the overseas regions holding EU citizenship). For critical discussion, see Dimitry 
Kochenov, EU Citizenship in the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 
199, 212. 
 30. Consider, for instance, the European Arrest Warrant which functions differently 
in the French OCTs, compared with the OCTs of any other Member State, where it is not 
applicable. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1. 
On the French position, see Council of the European Union, Note from French Delegation on 
the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the French Overseas Departments and 
Territories, Doc. 11356/04, Brussels (9 July 2004). For more examples, see Fletcher, supra 
note 5; Blockmans, supra note 5. 
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At issue are continental territories,31 as well as thousands of islands, 
islets and archipelagos in all the Oceans,32 belonging to Denmark, Finland,33 
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom,34 which 
jointly (when counted with territorial waters) span a territory far greater 
than that of the European part of the Union.35 Although the process of 
decolonisation has diminished the extent of the Member States’ territorial 
reach, necessarily toning down the ambitions of the Internal Market, which 
was initially conceived as “Eurafrica,”36 the scale of the EU’s direct 
involvement with the non-European territories of the Member States, as 
well as with European territories where the main principle of full 
application of EU law as stated in Article 52 TEU applies with deviations, 
remains very considerable indeed. 
The reasons behind such deviations from the main rule vary and are 
rooted in numerous considerations, ranging from the upholding of a 
particular territory’s status under international law37 to the protection of 
minority cultures,38 the reflection of the attained level of autonomy in 
  
 31. The only continental territory outside of Europe belonging to a Member State is 
French Guiana. However, Gibraltar provides another example of a continental territory 
where the application of EU law is profoundly atypical, even though, sensu stricto, it is 
located in Europe. 
 32. See the map in Figure 1. 
 33. Although the Åland Islands are in the European waters, of course. 
 34. See HENDRY & DICKSON, supra note 25. 
 35. See Tables 1, 2, and 3 listing all such territories. 
 36. Jean-Marie Palayret, Les mouvements proeuropéens et la question de 
l’Eurafrique du Congrès de La Haye à la Convention de Yaoundé (1948–1963), in L’EUROPE 
UNIE ET L’AFRIQUE: DE L’IDÉE D’EURAFRIQUE À LA CONVENTION DE LOMÉ I 185 (Marie-
Thérèse Bitsch & Gérard Bossuat eds., 2006). See also Custos, supra note 11, at 94-101. The 
absolute majority of the founding Member States had overseas territories under their control 
at the moment of the entry of the first Treaties marking European integration into force. 
Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27. 
 37. Which is the case of the Åland Islands, for instance. The special regime 
governing the Islands in EU law, which is reflected in TFEU art. 335(4), was put into place 
to respect arrangements existing in international law. See Report Submitted to the Council of 
the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. 
B.7.21/68/106 (1921); the guarantee to be given to the population of the Åaland Islands 
(adopted June 27, 1921) in The Åaland Islands Question, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 691 
(1921). The special regime for the Islands dates back to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, 
aimed at guaranteeing the demilitarisation of the Islands (then a territory within the Russian 
Empire). See Martin Ekman, The Right to Be Small and Different, 10 JERSEY L. REV. 2006, 
available at http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/oct06/JLR0610_Ekman. 
aspx; AUTONOMY AND DEMILITARISATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ÅLAND ISLANDS IN A 
CHANGING EUROPE (Lauri Hannikainen & Frank Horn eds., 1997). See also Dimitry 
Kochenov, Regional Citizenships and EU Law: The Case of the Åland Islands and New 
Caledonia, 35 EUR. L. REV. 307 (2010). 
 38. Which is the case of the Sami lands and, at least in part, the Channel Islands. See 
Documents Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway to the European Union: Protocol No. 3 
on the Sami People, Aug. 29 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 352 [hereinafter Protocol No. 3 on the 
Sami People] and Protocol No. 2 on the Faroe Islands & Protocol No. 3 on the Channel 
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national law,39 as well as decolonisation.40 Although a number of different 
relevant factors can be cumulatively applied, the most common reasons for 
special treatment are related to the need to adapt the application of EU law 
in particular territories to the discrepancies in the level of wealth, 
socioeconomic development, climate, and a number of other similar 
factors.41 These factors distinguish the territory in question from the main 
territory of the EU where the acquis applies in full and reflects the special 
status of such territories in national law42 or the willingness of a particular 
self-governing territory not to be covered by EU law. 
Legally speaking, the EU’s involvement with such territories is mostly 
channelled through three main statuses in EU law granted to each particular 
territory in question, including Outermost Region (OR) status,43 Overseas 
Country or Territory Associated with the Union (OCT) status,44 and a 
  
Islands and the Isle of Man, of the Documents Concerning the Accession to the European 
Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and Kingdom of Norway and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, Mar. 27, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 164 
[hereinafter 1972 Treaty of Accession]. See also Danielle Perrot & Franck Miatti, Les 
Lapons et les îles Åland dans le quatrième élargissement: Contribution à l’étude de la 
différenciation juridique au sein de la Communauté européenne, 413 REVUE DU MARCHÉ 
COMMUN 670, 671-76. For the general analysis of the role of minority protection in EU law, 
see, for example, Dimitry Kochenov, The Summary of Contradictions: Outline of the EU’s 
Numerous Approaches to Minority Protection, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 39. See Treaty Amending with Regard to Greenland the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities, Jan. 2, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 29) 1. 
 40. Which was the case of numerous former colonies that have managed to gain 
independence. In the current situation, New Caledonia, along with Bermuda, is one of the 
rare Member State territories included on the UN list of territories whose people have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government. It was struck from this list in 1947, but got 
reintroduced on the list in 1986. See G.A. Res. 41/41A, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 
53, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/41A (Dec. 2, 1986). 
 41. For a sample of factors useful to explain ratione loci differentiation, see TFEU 
art. 349. 
 42. See Alain Moyrand, Théorie de la souveraineté partagée, in LA SOUVERAINETÉ 
PARTAGÉE EN NOUVELLE CALÉDONIE ET EN DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 27, at 29. 
 43. E.g. Saint-Martin, La Réunion, Madeira. See TFEU arts. 349, 355(1). See, e.g., 
Ismaël Omarjee, Specific Measures of the Outermost Regions After the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 121; Perrot, Les régions 
ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 717; Kochenov, 
supra note 3, at 227–44; Christian Vitalien, Les régions ultra-périphériques entre 
assimilation et différenciation [The Outermost Regions between Assimilation and 
Differentiation], 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE [FRENCH REV. OF PUB. 
ADMIN.] 115 (2002); Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 paragraphe 2, supra note 27, at 111; 
Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491; Fabien Brial, La place des régions ultrapériphériques, 5-6 
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 639 (1998); Omarjee, supra note 27, at 515; JACQUES ZILLER, 
LES DOM-TOM 60-78 (1996); Elisa Paulin & Marie-Josèphe Rigobert, Les Régions 
Ultrapériphériques et la CEE, 368 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 
[RMCUE] 436 (1993). 
 44. E.g., Bermuda, Greenland, Wallis-et-Futuna. See TFEU art. 355(2) & Annex II. 
See also TFEU Part IV. For an analysis, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Impact of European 
Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European 
 
680 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
plethora of ad hoc arrangements applicable to the Member State territories 
which do not fall squarely within the two statuses mentioned, but can be 
classed as a group of territories sui generis.45 Theoretically, yet another 
status could be added to the list: that of the European territory for whose 
external relations a Member State is responsible.46 However, since this 
category currently covers only Gibraltar,47 the latter is herewith included 
among the sui generis territories, insofar as it represents a deviation from 
the other two main statuses applicable to the territories of the Member 
States where the application of the acquis is atypical, i.e. the OR and OCT 
statuses.  
Roughly speaking, the starting assumption applicable to the ORs is that 
the EU acquis applies in full unless the contrary is stated,48 which is 
reversed in the case of the OCTs.49 The latter are, according to the ECJ, 
neither parts of the Union,50 nor third countries.51 According to established 
case law, “failing express provisions, the general provisions of the Treaty do 
not apply to [such] countries and territories.”52 
In practice, however, this division is much less obvious than what one 
might expect: both main legal statuses seem to converge in a number of 
important respects,53 while territories sui generis offer an example of 
flexible arrangements which can largely be turned either way. Key reasons 
for such convergence include the inherently limited nature of the ratione 
loci derogations contained in the Treaties, which are, as follows from the 
term itself, focused on the territoriality of the application of the law, paying 
little—if any—attention to other important factors, such as the personal 
scope of the law.54 Other examples could be the willingness of the overseas 
regions and territories to apply EU law, even when it is not required, simply 
  
Community, 36 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 239 (2009); Kochenov, supra note 3, at 
245-55; Jacques Ziller, Les outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la 
mondialisation—L’association des pays et territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté 
européenne, 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 127 (2002); ZILLER, LES 
DOM-TOM, supra note 43, at 110–117; See van Rijn, supra note 27, at 126–36. 
 45. E.g., Færœ Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey. See TFEU arts. 355(4) (5). See 
also Kochenov, supra note 3, at 212, 256. 
 46. TFEU art. 355(3). 
 47. On the status of Gibraltar, see the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession 
and the Adjustments to the Treaties of the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38, art. 28. 
 48. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 49. TFEU art. 355(2). 
 50. Case C-390/95 P, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 
36. 
 51. Since they are under the sovereignty of one of the Member States and since EU 
law applies there, at least in part. 
 52. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643, ¶ 10; Case C-
110/97, Netherlands v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 49; Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger 
v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. 
 53. See, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 44. 
 54. See id.; Kochenov, supra note 29. 
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because of its more advanced nature compared with regulation available 
locally.55 The same applies to the vital importance of the Union to the 
remote territories of the Member States in terms of gaining a privileged 
status in their respective regions of the world, and in being a way to deal 
with the inherent deficiencies of their small size,56 among other factors.57 
The need to be connected, however loosely, with the EU, ensures the very 
survival of some of the territories in question as independent economic and 
political actors,58 enabling them to guarantee the high standard of living for 
their inhabitants. The realisation of the need to remain strongly associated 
with the former colonial centre, once realised, could certainly pose 
problems, as exemplified by Prime Minister Eman in his contribution, 
which mentions the Aruban fight against full independence from the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.59 An example of the vision contrary to the 
Aruban one would be New Caledonia, an OCT connected with France, 
which stands firmly on the way towards Kanak independence.60 
Natural convergence in the essential contenue of the three legal statuses 
available in EU law only adds to the difficulties related to outlining the 
scope of the applicable EU law. In fact, the differences between different 
territories formerly belonging to the same category in EU law (be it OR or 
  
 55. See, e.g., Eman & Sevinger, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 159 (Advocate General 
Tizzano’s Opinion). The consequences of such voluntary adoption in the context of EU law 
are not always clear and can be potentially very far-reaching, as in light of Case C-28/95, 
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur der Belastingen/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2, 1997 E.C.R. I-
4161, ¶ 34. See also MORTEN BROBERG & NEILS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 143-52 (2010); Broberg, supra note 11, at 150. 
 56. See generally Mike Eman, Defending the Democratic Rights of EU Citizens 
Overseas: A Personal Story, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 433. 
 57. Some other handicaps are listed in TFEU art. 349, para. 1, outlining the context 
of the application of EU law in the ORs. By analogy, they should clearly be considered as 
relevant factors in analysing the OCTs too, as well as the reasons behind the special status 
enjoyed by the OCTs. 
 58. If not preventing their simple disappearance from the political map, as 
exemplified by the Falkland war and the recent tension between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and Venezuela over the Caribbean countries of the Kingdom. 
 59. The Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarded the status of Aruba as a 
separate country (land) within the Kingdom of the Netherlands upon Aruba’s splitting away 
from the now defunct Federation of the Netherlands Antilles merely as a step to full 
independence Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Stb. 1954, p. 503; See also 
Wijziging van 11 januari 1985, Stb. 1985, p. . It took Aruba plenty of effort to remain a part 
of the Kingdom and thus avoid getting full independence. Dimitry Kochenov, The EU and 
the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Associated with the 
Union, and Territories Sui Generis, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 3, 14 n.56. 
 60. Dominique Custos, New Caledonia, a Case of Shared Sovereignty within the 
French Republic: Appearance or Reality? 13 EUR. PUB. L. 97 (2007). See also Alan Berman, 
1998 and Beyond in New Caledonia: At Freedom’s Gate?, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 
(1998); Alan Berman, Future Kanak Independence in New Caledonia: Reality or Illusion?, 
34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287 (1998). See also DESTINS DES COLLECTIVITÉS POLITIQUES D’OCÉANIE: 
PEUPLES, POPULATIONS, NATIONS, ÉTATS, TERRITOIRES, PAYS, PATRIES, COMMUNAUTÉS, 
FRONTIÈRES (Jean-Yves Faberon, Viviane Fayaud & Jean-Marc Regnault eds., 2011). 
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OCT) can sometimes be so considerable that the very appropriateness of the 
existing categories can in some cases be legitimately put in doubt. This is 
particularly true in the case of the OCTs. As Dominique Custos has 
abundantly demonstrated, the single legal status of the OCT has never 
actually materialised in EU law,61 as it seems to unite territories where the 
application of EU law is often profoundly dissimilar.62 In this respect, the 
difference between the OCTs and the ORs is somewhat clearer, even though 
it was virtually non-existent before the landmark Hansen decision of the 
ECJ,63 which sharpened the understanding of the OR status and laid the 
essential foundations for the distinctions existing between the OCTs and the 
ORs in the first place, textual differences to be found in the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties notwithstanding. Moreover, albeit via different 
legal means, i.e. by not applying EU law by default in the case of the OCTs, 
as opposed to applying it with profound derogations in the case of the ORs, 
a strikingly similar landscape of legal regulation can arise in practice in the 
context of the regulation of certain fields, de facto virtually removing the 
practical difference between the two statuses entirely. The story of the 
octroi de mer levies (i.e. dock dues)64 in the ORs65 and the OCTs66 provides 
a telling illustration of this convergence. 
  
 61. See Custos, supra note 11. 
 62. Bermuda is probably the most extreme example of this, as, although its status as 
an OCT cannot be put in doubt as it is included in Annex II of the TFEU, which lists all the 
territories with such a status, the provisions on the association with the Union actually do not 
apply to it in practice. The Association Decision of the Council govrning the practical 
technicalities of the status of the OCT states that “[t]he arrangements for association laid 
down in this Decision should not be applied to Bermuda in accordance with the wishes of the 
Government of Bermuda.” Council Decision 2001/822/EC, of 27 November 2001 on the 
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Community 
(‘Overseas Association Decision’), pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 314) 1. In this respect, the practical 
difference between OCT status and that of a territory sui generis, just to give one example, is 
not clear. It has been persuasively argued that the exclusion of Bermuda from the scope of 
application of the Association Decision cannot take precedence over the text of Annex IV, 
which includes Bermuda among other associated countries and territories. For this argument 
as well as the discussion of other scholarly opinions, see Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 338-
39, n.27. 
 63. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. 
 64. For a detailed legal analysis of the legality of octroi de mer under Community 
law, see Marco Slotboom, L’application du traité CE au commerce intraétatique: Le cas de 
l’octroi de mer, 32 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 9, 9 (1996). See also Puissochet, supra note 
27, at 504-06. For a good summary of the development of the octroi de mer case-law of the 
ECJ, see Case C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés v. Ministre des Finances, 1996 E.C.R. I-
5647. 
 65. See Council Decision 2004/162/EC, Concerning the Dock Dues in the French 
Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 
O.J. (L 52) 64. 
 66. See, e.g., Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643. For an 
analysis, see Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 149.  
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When approaching the legal situation of the overseas countries, 
territories, regions, and departments, a dynamic analysis of the law is 
absolutely indispensable as the legal statuses at issue have been in a 
constant process of mutation, shaped and remoulded by the Member States’ 
concerns, regular treaty amendments and ECJ case law. Mostly regarded as 
a burden throughout the Union’s history,67 the essential approach to the 
overseas regions and territories of the Member States in the Union seems to 
be changing at the moment,68 enabling Dominique Custos to speak about a 
positive “shift in the perception of the Overseas from the EU’s 
perspective.”69 However, this change in approach notwithstanding, the fact 
that a huge number of overwhelmingly important and apparently not 
envisaged changes in the application of EU law in such territories were 
introduced into the Treaties with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon70 makes it clear that the amount of attention that such territories 
attract is insufficient by far to solve the outstanding problems they are 
facing.71 Most importantly, the recent changes seem to imply that the 
amount of applicable EU law could actually be reduced in some overseas 
countries and territories, which is not necessarily the case and is discussed 
infra in detail.  
The scale of the legal issues arising from the interplay between the 
“normal” way to apply the acquis and the three statuses reserved for the 
territories of the Member States lying outside of the classical scope ratione 
  
 67. The wording of the relevant Treaty provisions routed in the founding Treaties 
and dating back to the fifties still reflects this approach, making an emphasis, to provide an 
OR-related example, on the handicaps of the regions in question, rather than stressing the 
positive side of their contribution to the EU integration project. See TFEU art. 349(1). For an 
analysis, see Custos, supra note 11, at 105. 
 68. As As exemplified in the recent Commission’s documents marking the new 
approach. See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Strategy for the Outermost Regions: Achievements and Future Prospects, COM (2007) 507 
final (Sept. 12, 2007); Communication from the Commission, The Outermost Regions: An 
Asset for Europe, COM (2008) 642 final (Oct. 17, 2008); Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Elements for a New Partnership between the 
EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), COM (2009) 623 final (Nov. 6, 
2009). 
 69. See Custos, supra note 11, at 110. 
 70. For detailed analysis, see Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries 
and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 81-88. 
 71. Faced with this obvious problem, the ORs and the OCTs started to group 
together to promote their interests. For an analysis of the OCTs, see, for example, Freya 
Baetens, The Overseas Countries and Territories Association: The Added Value of a 
Concerted Approach, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 383. See, e.g., Marc 
Janus, Un lobby originale des régions ultrapériphériques de la Communauté européenne, 
388 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE 326 (1995), for more 
information about the ORs. 
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loci of EU law, as restated in Article 52 TEU, coupled with the high 
complexity of the legal design of derogations and specific features marking 
their nature, beg for a specific term to unite all these matters in one sub-
discipline to tackle them in their legal evolution with the seriousness and 
precision they deserve. To address this challenge, the notion of EU Law of 
the Overseas has been introduced,72 which, although new to English-
speaking lawyers, is an accepted name for this branch of EU law in France, 
where it goes under the name of droit européen d’outre mer.73 The term 
“Overseas” itself, although seemingly strange, has been chosen for its 
general character. A word was needed that would encompass a reference to 
any of the overseas regions, territories, departments, dependencies, etc., of 
the Member States, no matter what status in EU or national law they 
possess. 
To provide a concise and complete overview of the EU Law of the 
Overseas, the article splits into sections dealing with the essential points 
governing the territorial scope of the Treaties and looking at the historical 
evolution of the present applicability of the EU and TFEU Treaties, as well 
as the Euratom in the Overseas (II), proceeding to the dynamic legal-
historical analysis of the key elements of the three legal statuses awarded to 
the Overseas in EU law, focusing on the ORs (III), on the OCTs (IV), as 
well as providing examples of several territories sui generis (V). The article 
then moves to the reassessment of the legal statuses presented from the 
point of view of derogations from the acquis (VI) and to the procedural 
issues of EU’s engagement with its Overseas, discussing the legal issues 
related to the changing of the legal statuses of overseas regions and 
territories in EU law (VII). The conclusion outlines the main challenges for 
the future and summarises the most important findings related to the essence 
of the core areas of the nascent EU Law of the Overseas (8).  
I. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE TREATIES: LEGAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
At the moment of the negotiation and the signing of the founding 
Treaties, the territorial configuration of what later became the Member 
States was quite different from the present-day picture. The six founding 
Member States (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands) exercised sovereignty over a huge territory in the form of 
colonial possessions, protectorates, overseas departments, etc., situated all 
over the world, but mostly on the African continent. The majority of these 
territories were not fully incorporated into the Member States, different law 
applying to them, compared with the metropolitan centres and including, 
  
 72. See generally EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 26. 
 73. See Dominique Custos, La révélation d’un droit communautaire d’outre-mer, in 
UNION EUROPÉENNE ET OUTRE-MERS: UNIS DANS LEUR DIVERSITÉ 429 (Laurent Tesoka & 
Jacques Ziller eds., 2008).  
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inter alia, such territories as the (Belgian) Congo, Rwanda-Burundi, the 
(Italian) protectorate of Somalia, the Netherlands New Guinea, The 
Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, Algeria, French Equatorial Africa—
including Côte-d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Sudan and Upper-Volta—French East Africa—comprising Moyen-Congo, 
Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad—the protectorates of Togo, Cameroon 
and Wallis-et-Futuna, Comoros Islands, Madagascar, Côte Française des 
Somalis, and the Etablissements français de l’Océanie (now French 
Polynesia). 
Given the huge economic potential of these territories, it is not surprising 
that the idea of a Eurafrican Common Market was considered very 
seriously at the time. The European powers saw the success of their future 
integration as directly related to the success of the gradual incorporation of 
the African dependent territories into the Single Market they planned to 
build. Eurafrica was supposed to incorporate the bigger parts of European 
and African continents, as archival research demonstrates.74 In fact, while 
the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC 
Treaty) was only to cover the European territories of the Member States, the 
two Treaties of Rome adopted a totally different perspective. France, in 
charge of the largest share of the overseas possessions among the six, 
simply refused to enter the Common Market with the other Member States-
to-be without a special accommodation of (in particular) its African 
territories. In the words of Professor Custos, “the spotlight was wholly put 
on the promises of Eurafrica”75—only to end abruptly with decolonisation.76 
While the Euratom Treaty was construed to apply to the entirety of the 
Member States’ territories, and thus still includes the Overseas,77 the EEC 
Treaty adopted a somewhat more nuanced approach. 
The level of economic development of all the territories in question, as 
well as their level of incorporation into the legal-political systems of the 
Herren der Verträge, varied to a great degree. It is thus not surprising that 
not all the parts of the Member States’ territories could be awarded identical 
status under the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty when the 
EEC was founded. The most important step made by the founding Member 
States in this regard was to agree to the French idea of the potential 
extension of what was then the Common Market to cover their overseas 
possessions, thus departing from the ECSC Treaty model, which assumed 
the non-application of the ECSC law in the Overseas.78 The first step to be 
made in this direction was to design a regime of association to tie the 
  
 74. Custos, supra note 11, at 99. 
 75. Id. at 101. 
 76. Id. at 102. 
 77. Euratom Treaty, supra note 11, art. 198. 
 78. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 97, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. 
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African, and other territories of the Member States with the European 
integration project. With this, the status of an OCT was born. Although this 
legal status did not imply full inclusion into the Common Market, it was 
clearly designed with a view to the eventual incorporation of the territories 
benefiting from such status into the scope ratione loci of EU law, where the 
acquis would apply in full.79 
Given that some non-European territories were legally entirely 
incorporated into the signatory states, they required a different legal status 
compared with that of the colonies and other possessions, to enjoy the 
association regime of the OCTs. At that time, France, having particular ties 
with its four Overseas Departments (DOM)80 and Algeria, demanded the 
inclusion into the Treaty, in addition to the association provisions for other 
possessions (which enjoyed an infinitely higher level of importance 
economically) of a special clause granting limited differentiated treatment to 
the incorporated territories overseas—which, albeit under a specific regime 
and with some derogations, were to fall within the scope of Community law 
under the former Article 227(2) EEC [which has now mutated into Article 
349 TFEU]—giving birth to what is now an OR legal regime.81 
Accordingly, the special status for the French DOM and Algeria in 
Community law was designed to differentiate between those overseas 
territories of the Member States which are incorporated into the state and 
those overseas territories which enjoy more autonomy under the national 
law of the Member State and do not generally fall within the territorial 
scope of full application of the EEC Treaty, as a special association regime 
applies. 
At the moment of the signing of the EEC Treaty, OCT status was granted 
to a huge number of Belgian, Dutch,82 French, and Italian territories not 
  
 79. See the analysis provided by Dominique Custos, Implications of the European 
Integration for the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5. 
 80. The French DOM included Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana and Réunion 
at the time. Due to the recent slight reshuffling of the French ORs, the list of the territories 
enjoying such status that are connected with France has become longer by two, incorporating 
Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, 
the Azores and Madeira joined the DOM in benefiting from the OR status arrangements upon 
the accession of Portugal to what used to be the Communities. See Documents Concerning 
the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European 
Communities, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, June 12, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 9 
[hereinafter Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty]. The Canary Islands came to be within the 
scope of the OR status in 1991. Council Regulation 1911/91, Application of the Provisions of 
Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (ECC). 
 81. The DOM and Algeria were legally inseparable from France and were included 
into the customs territory of the Republic. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491. 
 82. In derogation from the general rule that the provisions of the EEC Treaty were to 
apply to the entirety of the territory of the Member States, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
only signed this Treaty for the Kingdom in Europe and the New Guinea. A special protocol 
to this end has been appended to the EC Treaty. Vincent Coussirat-Coustère, Article 227, in 
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fully incorporated into the constitutional structure of these Member States,83 
marking a huge success of the French policy, only to be extended further 
upon the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark to the 
Communities.84 
  
TRAITE INSTITUANT LA CEE 1419, 1422 (1992). Therefore, while the Treaty was later 
extended to cover the Dutch Islands in the Caribbean, it never has applied to Suriname. De 
Overeenkomst tot wijziging van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap ten einde de bijzondere associeatieregeling van het vierde deel van het 
Verdrag op de Nederlandse Antillen te doen zijn, Nov. 13 1962, 1964 J.O. (2413) 64. 
 83. The status of countries or territories associated with the Community was first 
granted to the Belgian territories of the Congo and Rwanda-Burundi, the Italian protectorate 
of Somalia, Netherlands New Guinea, and French equatorial Africa (Côte-d’Ivoire, 
Dahomey, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Upper-Volta), French East Africa 
(Moyen-Congo, Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad), the protectorates of Togo and 
Cameroon, the Comoros Islands (Mayotte, separated from them is still associated with the 
EU under Art. 355(2) TFEU and included into Annex II TFEU), Madagascar and Côte 
Française des Somalis. To be added to this list are: the present French OCT, including the 
French Polynesia, which used to be called Etablissements français de l’Océanie; Wallis-and-
Futuna, which is still a French protectorate; New Caledonia and Dependencies, French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories and St. Pierre-et-Miquelon. See generally Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 145-147. See De Overeenkomst tot wijziging 
van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap ten einde de 
bijzondere associeatieregeling van het vierde deel van het Verdrag op de Nederlandse 
Antillen te doen zijn, Nov. 13 1962, 1964 J.O. (2413) 64. See, on this issue, Dimitry 
Kochenov, Le droit européen et le fédéralisme néerlandais: Une dynamique en évolution 
progressive, in DESTINS DES COLLECTIVITÉS POLITIQUES D’OCÉANIE, supra note 60, at 345; 
M.M. Bense & E.B. Pronk, Constitutionele aspecten bij de staatkundige hervorming van het 
Koninkrijk, 2010 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT [TVCR] 61; L.J.J. Rogier, Het 
Koninkrijk der nederlanden na de opheffing van de Nederlandse Antillen op oktober 2010, 
2010 ARS AEQUI 563; H.G. Hoogers, De herstructurering van het Koninkrijk als 
lakmoesproef, 2010 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT 256; SCHURENDE 
RECHTSORDES: OVER JURIDISCHE IMPLICATIES VAN DE UPG-STATUS VOOR DE EILANDGEBIEDEN 
VAN DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN ARUBA (Herman Bröring et al. eds., 2008). 
 84. See 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38. Following the UK accession, the 
list of the associated countries and territories became much longer, including (in addition to 
the countries and territories still included in Annex II TFEU, such as Anguilla, Cayman 
Islands, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands, Montserrat, 
Pitcairn, Saint Helena and Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean 
Territory, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda) the Bahamas, 
Brunei, the Caribbean Colonies and Associated States (including Antigua, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Anguilla, and British Honduras), the 
Gilbert and Ellis Islands and the Line Islands, the Anglo-French Condominium of the New 
Hebrides, Solomon Islands, and Seychelles. Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, 
supra note 27, at 145-147; HENDRY & DICKSON, supra note 25. 
  Greenland acquired OCT status as a result of leaving the EEC. See Treaty 
Amending, With Regard to Greenland, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 
1985 O.J. (L 29) 1 (the OCT status of Greenland is also reflected in Annex II TFEU). For an 
analysis, see Fiedl Weiss, Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communities, 10 
EUR. L. REV. 173 (1985). The possibility of Greenland’s Association status was discussed in 
the academic literature even before the actual accession of Denmark to the EEC. See, e.g., 
Christen Boye Jacobsen, The Færœ Islands and Greenland and the European Communities, 
in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 170 (M.E. Bathurst et al. eds., 
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In other words, although two different regimes applied, the ultimate goal 
of incorporation into the Common Market marked the development of both 
of them. The main difference between the two concerned more than 
anything the precise timing of such incorporation, as while Article 227 EEC 
contained clear deadlines for possible adjustments of some parts of the 
acquis to the objective realities of the DOM different from Europe,85 the 
Association regime of the OCT status did not provide for any clear 
timetables. Nonetheless, the drive towards decolonisation clearly destroyed 
the initial plans that informed the French ultimatum on the inclusion of its 
African possessions, making the participation of the Republic in the EEC 
dependent on the agreement of other partners to the eventual incorporation 
of the Overseas into the European project. 
Following the abandonment of the Eurafrican dream and the dramatic 
shrinking in the number of the territories falling within the OCT category, 
OR status—which could never boast particular importance at the 
preparation stages of the EEC compared with the defining role played by 
the OCTs—naturally rose to prominence due to its relative economic power 
(which used to be negligent compared to that of the OCT before 
decolonisation) not to mention its relative population size (compared with 
the remaining OCTs). This, notwithstanding the gaining of independence by 
Algeria86 and its subsequent withdrawal from the list of the territories where 
OR status applies.87 The integration project was subsequently retuned 
inwards,88 with the newly independent colonies successfully forgotten and 
safely ignored.89 
  
1972). For a meticulous analysis of the contemporary law on leaving the Union, see Adam 
Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 EUR. 
L. REV. 2012 (forthcoming). 
 85. See EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). 
 86. On the role played by Algeria in the EEC, see Paul Tavernier, Aspects juridiques 
des relations économiques entre la C.E.E. et l’Algérie, 8 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
EUROPÉEN [R.T.D.E.] 1 (1972). 
 87. It has to be noted that “OR” status as such did not exist at that time, as the 
relevant provision of the EEC Treaty merely established a special legal regime for the French 
DOM and Algeria, without giving it a particular name. Curiously, Algeria was only struck 
from the list of territories where Article 227(2) of the EEC was to apply with the Maastricht 
revision of the Treaties, i.e. roughly thirty years after the gaining of independence by this 
country. 
 88. Notwithstanding the special association regime which was created for the former 
colonies. See, most recently, Agreement amending the Partnership Agreement between the 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 
2000, 2005 O.J. (L 209) 27. See Justin Daniel, Le cadre institutionnel et le dialogue sur les 
politiques: L’Accord de Cotonou à l’épreuve d’une réhabilitation du politique, in LES 
RELATIONS ACP/UE APRÉS LE MODÈLE DE LOMÉ—QUEL PARTENARIAT? 261 (Danielle Perrot 
ed., 2007).  
 89. Virtually all the available literature on the issue is silent on the roots of the OCT 
status, taking the existing OCTs and ORs as its starting point, which naturally alters the 
assessment of the first steps of integration with respect to the governance of the Overseas. 
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The Treaties currently in force are profoundly rooted in the reality of 
decolonisation dating back fifty years and basically employ the same 
division of the Overseas into classes as the one established at the moment 
when the other five partners accepted the French demands and embarked 
towards the Eurafrican dream, notwithstanding the fact that the very idea of 
Eurafrica is largely forgotten. The change in the balance of the Overseas 
that was necessarily brought about by the independence of all the most 
economically promising overseas possessions of the Member States resulted 
in a situation where the role of the Overseas, so important in accordance 
with the initial projects, deteriorated virtually entirely, marking a fading 
away in the interest or concerns about the Overseas, of which the prior lack 
of the academic attention to these territories is a sound illustration. 
Consequently, the three fundamental statuses granted to the Member States’ 
territories where the main rule of Article 52(1) TEU only applies with 
derogations have a very long history and are rooted in the negotiations 
preceding the drafting of the EEC Treaty more than half a century ago. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the main legal regimes governing the 
status of each group of the Overseas in EU law individually, the controversy 
sparked by the Treaty of Maastricht has to be mentioned, as it has 
introduced an element of unpredictability into the scope ratione loci of 
several important branches of EU law, the consequences of which are still 
felt today. At the centre of the controversy was the fact that the pre-Lisbon 
version of the EU Treaty first introduced at Maastricht90 did not contain any 
provisions specifying its territorial scope of application. Consequently, 
while it was clear how EC and Euratom law were to apply in the Overseas, 
EU law sensu stricto could not boast this clarity. It has been claimed in the 
literature that the relevant provisions of EU law at the time—concentrated 
in what used to be the Second91 and the Third Pillars92 of the Union (a 
division which is now obsolete) dealing with police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters and the EU’s external action (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP))—were not territorial in nature per se,93 which 
would make the very issue of ratione loci not applicable for them. However, 
this view of the law appears somewhat too simplistic, which became an 
especially acute issue after a number of legal instruments of binding nature, 
  
Professor Custos’s recent research is particularly important in this regard, since her archival 
research directly challenges the presumptions that OR status was more important in the eyes 
of the six founding Member States than that of the OCTs. Custos, supra note 11. 
 90. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter 
Maastricht TEU]. 
 91. Maastricht TEU arts. 11–28 (as in effect 1992). 
 92. Id. arts. 29–42 (as in effect 1992). 
 93. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM 93 (Laurence W. Gormley 
ed., 3d ed. 1998). See also Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–223; JO SHAW, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ELECTORAL RIGHTS AND THE 
RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL SPACE 177 (2007). 
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such as the European Arrest Warrant94 for instance, entered the context of 
this “non-territorial” law upon the introduction by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
of the possibility to adopt Framework Decisions in the context of what used 
to be the Third Pillar of the EU.95 
The main rule of international law to govern ratione loci questions of 
this order is well known and has been summarised by P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. 
VerLoren van Themaat in the context of their assessment of the scope of 
application of EC law in following way: “Under general rules of 
international law it is clear that the Treaty is binding in relation to all the 
territory, including non-European parts falling under the sovereignty of the 
Parties, at least in so far as the Treaty does not provide for exceptions or 
otherwise make special provision.”96 
Applied to EC law, the same principle should have clearly also governed 
the application of the pre-Lisbon EU law. This has not happened, however. 
Notwithstanding the clarity of the international law on the issue, the practice 
of application of pre-Lisbon EU law in the Overseas pointed to the lack of 
clarity and the fragmentation of the law. The Member States adopted 
diametrically opposed approaches in this regard, either applying EU law in 
full to the entirety of their territory—thus including the Overseas, no matter 
which of the statuses available in EU law they enjoy (like France)97—or 
presuming that the provisions of the pre-Lisbon EU Treaty had to follow the 
territorial scope of the EC Treaty,98 thus recognising only a limited 
application in certain Member State overseas territories.99 Once again, the 
EU Treaty itself was silent on the matter. Moreover, due to the limited role 
entrusted to the ECJ in these areas (especially in the CFSP), no clarification 
could be expected from the Court. Consequently, a situation arose where the 
uniformity of application of EU Law in the Overseas was profoundly 
undermined and depended solely on the interpretation of the law by the 
Member State with which each particular territory was connected. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has seemingly resolved this controversy, since it 
removed the old Pillar structure of the Union and united the scopes ratione 
loci of the two Treaties by providing a cross-reference from Article 52(2) 
  
 94. For an analysis of the functioning of this instrument in the EU’s Overseas, see 
Fletcher, supra note 5. 
 95. Maastricht TEU art. 34(2)(b) (as in effect 1992). 
 96. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 93, at 89 (footnotes omitted). 
See also KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 351 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 97. In the literature, this position is reflected very clearly by Karagiannis: “a priori, 
les dispositions non communautaires du Traité sur l’Union européenne ont comme champ 
d’application l’intégralité du territoire des parties contractantes.” Karagiannis, supra note 19, 
at 340.  
 98. See generally KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 93. 
 99. For the criticism of this position see, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–20. 
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TEU to Article 355 TFEU.100 It is thus currently clear that the territorial 
scopes of application of the law of both Treaties in question are clearly 
defined and overlap entirely. As far as Euratom is concerned, there was no 
change there, and its law applies to the entirety of the territories of the 
Member States, including the Overseas. The silence of the pre-Lisbon EU 
Treaty was thus replaced by an embrace of the three special statuses known 
in European law since the entry into force of the EEC Treaty. The three now 
cover the EU Treaty, too. 
However, this arrangement does not actually touch upon the essence of 
the problem surrounding the territorial application of the EU Treaty. This is 
because although it is clear that the Treaties have identical territorial scopes, 
the question of the application or non-application of EU law in the different 
classes of the Overseas territories remains. The Member States continue to 
use diverging practices in this regard. Indeed, should the argument that the 
law of the former Second and the Third Pillars is not really territorial in 
nature since, in the words of Jo Shaw, “[it] merely binds the governments of 
the Member States,”101be accepted, all the old questions become only more 
pressing, rather than being resolved. The biggest controversy arises, as 
could be expected, with respect to the OCT status. Some authors still seem 
to subscribe to the established position of the ECJ that “the OCTs are 
subject to the special association arrangements set out in Part Four of the 
Treaty (Articles 182 to 188 EC [now Articles 198–204 TFEU]) with the 
result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do 
not apply to them.”102 
To agree with Jacques Ziller, in the near future the Court is likely to 
depart from this approach, reflecting the change in the Primary Law.103 In 
fact, the position of the Court, which seemed somewhat light-hearted even 
before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,104 now seems, with all 
respect, entirely inadequate. This is not only due to the fact that a huge 
number of the provisions of the Treaties contained outwith Part IV TFEU 
obviously apply, at least de facto, to the OCTs, but also due to the expansion 
of the role played by EU citizenship in the Overseas, which introduced 
important corrections into the accepted approaches to the interpretation of 
  
 100. For a general analysis of this change in the context of the CFSP, see, e.g., Peter 
Van Elsuwege, EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a 
New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency, 47 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 987 
(2010). 
 101. SHAW, supra note 93, at 177. 
 102. See Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van burdemeester en 
wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. The Commission faithfully supports 
this view. See, e.g., Commission Green Paper, supra note 29, at 3. 
 103. See Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others 
after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, 
at 73. 
 104. For criticism, see, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217 et seq.; Ziller, The 
European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, supra note 3. 
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the limits territorial derogations.105 The same applies to the fundamental 
principles.106 Given that some law applies via the scope ratione loci of EU 
law and also that some other provisions must apply by default to make Part 
IV TFEU operational, as such it becomes abundantly clear that, contrary to 
what the ECJ keeps repeating, Part IV TFEU is not all the law applicable to 
the OCT. Far from it. 
There is a pressing need to attune the case law with reality at this point. 
Sooner or later the Court is bound to agree with the position that Part IV 
TFEU is merely a derogation from Part III TFEU, the former rather than the 
latter applying to the OCTs. In the words of Jacques Ziller,  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the territorial scope of 
application is unified for all EU policies, be they under the TEU or the 
TFEU, be they in Part III TFEU on Union policies and internal actions, or 
in Part V TFEU on the Union’s external action. This is a confirmation, in 
my view, of the thesis which ventures that Part IV TFEU on OCTs cannot 
be considered as a comprehensive lex specialis covering the same ground 
as the Treaties. Part IV TFEU establishes a special legal basis for 
association for Union policies and internal actions, as an exception to Part 
III TFEU. It cannot impede the application to OCTs of the TEU and of 
Parts I TFEU on Principles, II TFEU on Non-discrimination and 
Citizenship or the Union, and VI TFEU on Institutional and Financial 
Provisions.107 
Reasoning in the same vein, Steven Blockmans asserts, quite simply, that 
“[t]he argument that EU law (in pre-Lisbon sense) [. . .] do[es] not apply to 
Greenland, New Caledonia and the other OCTs should be discarded.”108 
Importantly, this view can be substantiated not only by the very wording of 
Article 355(2) TFEU, which states that “[t]he special arrangements for 
association set out in Part Four shall apply to the overseas countries and 
territories listed in Annex II”109—thus being remarkably silent with regard 
to any principle of “non-application” of the law, which is found constantly 
restated in the ECJ’s case law on the matter—but also by the historical roots 
of the status of the OCT, as groundbreaking research by Dominique Custos 
  
 105. See Kochenov, supra note 29; Kochenov, supra note 44. 
 106. See, e.g., Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van burdemeester en 
wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055 (fundamental unwritten principle of equality 
was at stake). 
 107. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
For a similar position, see also Blockmans, supra note 5, at 307; Custos, supra note 11. See 
also H.G. Hoogers, De BES-eilanden, de Grondwet en het Europese recht: Over 
constitutionele en Europeesrechtelijke consequenties van de handhaving van de LGO-status 
van de BES-eilanden, 24 REGELMAAT 5, 9 (2009). But see Broberg, supra note 11, at 142-48 
(embracing the limited approach of the ECJ). 
 108. Blockmans, supra note 5, at 319-20. 
 109. TFEU art. 355(2). 
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has clearly demonstrated.110 Knowing that the historical roots of the status 
lie in the idea of incorporation of the OCT into the European integration 
project and that the very signing of the EEC Treaty was made conditional 
on such incorporation certainly presents the arguments in favour of the 
exclusive reading of Part IV TFEU as the only EU law applicable to the 
OCTs in a somewhat dubious light. 
All in all, although the Treaty of Lisbon has simplified the rules on the 
scope ratione loci of the Treaties to some extent, it did not entirely resolve 
the controversy arising from the failure of the drafters of the Treaty of 
Maastricht to include into the pre-Lisbon EU Treaty any provision that 
would either directly govern this issue, or provide a cross-reference to the 
other Treaties. However, as the structural and historical analysis of the 
Treaty texts currently abundantly demonstrates, there is a clash between the 
popular reading of the scope of the law reflected in the case law of the 
Court, and what the wording of the Treaties seems to imply. The academic 
disagreement which arose from this somewhat unfortunate discrepancy will 
fade away in the near future as the understanding of the implications of the 
new reality, especially in its historical context, gradually takes hold. 
Already today, sound consensus is being formed to regard the ECJ’s 
position in the most critical terms: “an overstated exclusionary status”111 is 
not legally substantiated. 
II. OUTERMOST REGIONS IN THE EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS 
The main rule governing OR status in EU law is the goal of the full 
incorporation of these territories within the scope ratione materiae of EU 
law, while taking into account the natural specificity of these regions.112 
This clearly follows from Article 355(1) TFEU, establishing that “[t]he 
provisions of the Treaties shall apply to Guadeloupe, French Guiana, 
Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands in accordance with Article 349 [TFEU],”113 the latter 
requiring the Council to “adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at 
  
 110. Custos, supra note 11. 
 111. See id. at 108. 
 112. Some elements of this and the following sections draw on Kochenov, supra note 
3. When this is the case, the text has been substantially updated to reflect the changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the changing context of the EU’s perception of 
the Overseas. Custos, supra note 11. 
 113. See TFEU art. 355(1). Note that the text of the Treaties does not employ the term 
“Outermost Regions,” which is, nevertheless, widely used in the scholarly literature and 
Commission’s communications when referring to the status of the territories mentioned in 
TFEU art. 355(1). See, e.g., Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 
299(2):The Outermost Regions of the European Union, COM (2000) 147 final/2 (May 19, 
2000) [hereinafter Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2)]. 
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laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to those 
regions.”114 
Historically, the development of the OR status has been marked by a 
constant shift in the balance between the ideal of full incorporation of these 
regions into the scope of the acquis and the need to pay adequate attention 
to the objective differentiating factors able to influence the application of 
the law in those regions, putting them in a position different from that of the 
European territories of the Member States. This constant balancing, in the 
words of Christian Vitalien “entre assimilation et différenciation,”115 thus 
lies at the core of this legal status. 
Consequently, a legal analysis of the essence of this status is impossible 
without paying due attention to its evolution, which has generally resulted 
in two important developments. Firstly, the evolution of the status is a 
gradual move away from the rigid understanding of the acquis towards 
more flexible solutions better suited to the regions in question. Secondly, it 
is also a move away from the negative perception of the ORs as problematic 
regions, resulting in a positive vision of their contribution to the European 
integration project, as well as their importance and potential.116 Both lines of 
development have been evolving hand-in-hand. In order to see them with all 
clarity, all the previous versions of Article 349 TFEU,117 including Article 
299(2) EC118 and Article 227(2) EEC,119 need to be considered in the light of 
the relevant ECJ case law, which shaped the interpretation and application 
of these provisions. 
Although the starting assumption has always been that the acquis applies 
in the ORs in full, all the provisions historically governing the territories 
enjoying such status allowed for substantial derogations from this principle. 
Importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon has cast away the rigid core of the status: 
i.e. the clear statement that the Treaties apply to the ORs, which was 
contained in all the pre-Lisbon instruments governing the legal position of 
such regions. Therefore, while the now obsolete Article 299(2) EC, 
similarly to Article 227(2) EEC, used to state unequivocally that “[t]he 
provisions of [the EC] Treaty shall apply to the [ORs],”120 the text of the 
current Article 355(1) TFEU seems very different, as the restatement of the 
fact that the acquis applied tout court to the ORs gave way to a more 
  
 114. TFEU art. 349(1). 
 115. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 115. 
 116. See Custos, supra note 11, at 108-19. 
 117. For an analysis of this provision, see Omarjee, supra note 43, at 121. See also 
Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, 
at 717. 
 118. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 515, 516. 
 119. For a detailed analysis of this article, see Coussirat-Coustère, supra note 82, at 
1419-30; Vitalien, supra note 43, at 115-17. 
 120. EC Treaty art. 299(2). 
2012] The Application of EU Law 695 
 
nuanced formulation, “in accordance with Article 349 [TFEU].”121 
Presumably, this change can be read as a sign of the widening of the room 
for manœuvre available to the Council and the Court in shaping the essence 
of the OR status in order to meet the needs of the regions in question in the 
best possible way, which is a development to be welcomed.122 
The toned-down text of the new provision notwithstanding, the 
presumption of application of the acquis in the ORs, unless the contrary is 
clearly stated in the secondary law adopted in accordance with the 
procedure outlined in Article 349 TFEU itself holds. In this respect, all the 
case law of the ECJ informing the interpretation of the old versions of the 
Article can clearly be of assistance in clarifying the nature of the legal 
status, as well as the extent of the possible derogations allowed under 
Article 349 TFEU.123 Established ECJ case law refuses to view the ORs as 
essentially different from the European territories of the Member States as 
far as the application of EU law is concerned. In one example, in 
Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons, the Court found 
that “[t]he situation of Réunion is not objectively different from that of the 
rest of the Community,”124 disagreeing with the argument presented by the 
claimant that Réunion (which is an OR now included on the list of such 
regions in contained in Article 355(1) TFEU) was in a situation essentially 
different from that of the Member State territories in Europe.  
ORs thus automatically fall within the scope of application of EU law: 
full application of the acquis there is the default position. Nevertheless, the 
practice of application of the earlier version of the relevant Treaty provision 
demonstrates quite clearly that this obvious reading of the Article has not 
always been accepted by the Member States and the Institutions of the 
Community. Having analysed the text of the Treaty provisions currently in 
force, the legal evolution of the OR status will be presented.  
  
 121. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 122. But see Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 721-24. 
 123. See generally Omarjee, supra note 43. 
 124. Case 58/86, Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons v. Receveur 
des douanes de Saint-Denis, 1987 E.C.R. 1525, ¶ 17. The case concerned the import levies 
on maize established by Council Regulation 2727/75, of 29 October 1975 on the Common 
Organization of the Market in Cereals, 1975 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EEC). This conclusion of the 
Court reached with regard to the free-movement of goods applies to other areas as well: the 
same flat rates of travel costs reimbursement apply to Community officials from the 
European part of France and the Island of Réunion. This, notwithstanding substantial 
differences in the costs of transportation, giving rise to proceedings before of the Civil 
Service Tribunal. See generally Case F-43/05, Chassagne v. Comm’n of the European 
Comtys, 2007 E.C.R. I-0027.  
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A. Main principles of Article 349 TFEU 
Article 349 TFEU, which is responsible for the OR status in the present 
version of the Treaties reads as follows:125 
Taking account of the structural social and economic situation of 
Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, 
Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is 
compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult 
topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the 
permanence and combination of which severely restrain their 
development, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures aimed, 
in particular, at laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to 
those regions, including common policies. Where the specific measures in 
question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, it shall also act on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament.  
  
 125. This provision is very similar to the text of its predecessor EC Treaty art. 299(2), 
which had the following wording:  
 
2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the French overseas 
departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands.  
 
However, taking account of the structural social and economic 
situation of the French overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands, which is compounded by their remoteness, 
insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain their development, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures 
aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of application of 
the present Treaty to those regions, including common policies. 
 
The Council shall, when adopting the relevant measures referred to 
in the second subparagraph, take into account areas such as customs 
and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries 
policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural 
funds and to horizontal Community programmes.  
 
The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the second 
subparagraph taking into account the special characteristics and 
constraints of the outermost regions without undermining the 
integrity and the coherence of the Community legal order, including 
the internal market and common policies. 
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The measures referred to in the first paragraph concern in particular areas 
such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture 
and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds 
and to horizontal Union programmes.  
The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the first paragraph 
taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of the 
outermost regions without undermining the integrity and the coherence of 
the Union legal order, including the internal market and common policies. 
The provision makes it clear to which territories the special status 
described by the Article applies. Just as with Annex II TFEU, containing the 
list of all the OCTs, this is a closed list.126 This means that the Member 
States cannot add territories to it as they please and the procedural 
requirements contained in the Treaties have to be satisfied in order to alter 
the list and extend the application of the Article to any new territory, or 
strike a territory from the list.127 
The previous versions of the provision could not boast such clarity. Since 
OR status was first designed to clarify the status of the French DOM and 
Algeria in European law, all the pre-Lisbon versions of the relevant 
provisions contained a reference to the French DOM, without naming each 
of such territories separately. Consequently, the illusion could be created 
that the status of an OR could be attained by a territory following a change 
in the Constitutional status of this territory within the French Republic, 
which caused some problems, particularly with regard to the legal status of 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon in European law.128 The enlargement of the OR 
status to cover non-French regions has only happened following the Iberian 
enlargement of the Communities.129 As a result, OR status came to be 
  
 126. The special regime described in TFEU art. 349 cannot apply to any territories 
that are not entered on the list. TFEU art. 349. See Answer Given by Mr. Prodi on Behalf of 
the Commission to Written Question E-2225/00 by Sebastiano Musumeci to the Commission 
on the Application of Article 299 of the EC Treaty, 2001 O.J. (C 81) 176. The question 
concerned whether the special regime of EC Treaty art. 299(2)  applied to the Islands of 
Sicily and Sardinia. EC Treaty art. 299(2) (as in effect 2002) (now TFEU art. 349). At the 
same time, the Council has used EC Treaty art. 299(2) as one of the legal bases to change the 
application of structural funds to “outlying Greek Islands which are under a handicap due to 
their distant location.” See Council Regulation 1447/2001, Amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, art. 1(1), 2001 
O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC). In other words, although EC Treaty art. 299(2) contains a closed list of 
regions where OR status applies, a specific regime which would be in some way de facto 
similar to this arrangement can also be granted to other territories. EC Treaty art. 299(2). 
 127. On the procedural aspects of territories’ status change in the EU Law of the 
Overseas, see Part VII infra; Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories 
and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, 
supra note 5, at 78; Omarjee, supra note 43, at 126. 
 128. For analysis, see infra Part VII. 
 129. See Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80. 
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applicable to Portuguese and Spanish regions as well. Initially, the statuses 
enjoyed by the Spanish and Portuguese ORs-to-be were entirely different 
from those of the DOM and were thus not covered by what was then Article 
227(2) EEC. Two quite different approaches were adopted: with regards to 
Madeira and the Azores, full integration into the EEC legal system was 
initially foreseen. Notwithstanding minor derogations enumerated in the Act 
of Accession, these territories were aiming at accepting the acquis in full 
after the expiry of the transitional periods. With regard to the Canary 
Islands, a status largely outside the scope of Community law was designed, 
the Islands not even being integrated into the customs territory of the 
Community. The situation changed in 1991, when the Canary Islands 
decided to embrace the acquis and denounce the special status outside of the 
law of the EEC granted to them,130 and when the Azores and Madeira, aware 
of their special handicaps comparable with other territories where 
Community law applied, opted for a special status under the EEC Treaty 
before the transitional periods under the relevant Act of Accession elapsed. 
As a result of this convergence, having started at two opposing sides of the 
legal spectrum, the Portuguese and the Spanish islands in question ended up 
being grouped together with the DOM and, as a result, ended up in the OR 
group. Consequently, the territories of only three Member States benefit 
from the status regulated by Article 349 TFEU. This Article only concerns 
France, Portugal, and Spain. 
All the territories entitled to OR status are very similar in their 
particularities: all of them are influenced by the factors negatively affecting 
their development mentioned in Article 349(1) TFEU and include 
“remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain development.”131 Important in this regard is that the 
Article does not presuppose that all the negative factors which it mentions 
should come together to affect negatively the same territory in order for it to 
benefit from OR status. However, it is absolutely clear from the text that the 
effect of these factors should be severe enough to justify the application of a 
special regime to the territory concerned. Moreover, “seuls les critères 
retenus dans l’énumération du traité peuvent fonder une démarche de 
différenciation.”132 In other words, this Article cannot be applied to 
relatively well-off regions not suffering from at least some of the particular 
drawbacks it lists. At the same time, being an island is not necessary, as the 
example of French Guiana demonstrates. 
The list of the negative points contained in Article 349(1) TFEU is the 
key to understanding the rationale for this provision. Only the particularities 
  
 130. Council Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the 
Provisions of Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EEC). 
 131. TFEU art. 349(1). 
 132. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 122. 
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of their climate, geographical position, etc. permit the justification of the 
possible deviations from the acquis. That is why the procedure that allows 
the Council to “adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down 
the conditions of application of the Treaties to [the ORs]”133 is found in the 
same subparagraph of the provision that lists the hardships which these 
regions face. The structure of the Article in question makes it clear that the 
Council is only allowed to legislate in order to remedy the specific 
difficulties described in the provision itself, not in order to defy the main 
principle of integrity of the Internal Market.134 This conclusion clearly 
follows from Article 349(3) TFEU, which expressly prohibits the abuse of 
the Article, resulting in “undermining the integrity and coherence of the 
Union legal order.”135 Specific mention of “the internal market and common 
policies”136 is extremely important in this regard, containing a clear 
indication of the inherent limitations governing the derogations from the 
acquis under this provision.137 In practice this means that Article 349 TFEU 
does not really have many teeth.138 
The guiding principle being the application of the acquis to the regions 
included in the list of Article 355(1) TFEU in full, Article 349(3) TFEU 
narrows the possible extent of deviation from this principle enormously. 
What kind of measures can the Council come up with that would not 
undermine the Internal Market or the common policies? The Council and 
the Commission, the proposing institution, are clearly invited to legislate 
very delicately, balancing two principles: full application of the acquis and 
possible limited deviations. 
  
 133. TFEU art. 349, para. 1. 
 134. For an analysis, see e.g., Danielle Perrot, Intégrité et cohérence de l’ordre 
juridique communautaire, in LE DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE EN PRINCIPES: LIBER 
AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN RAUX 615 (Jean Raux ed., 2006). 
 135. TFEU art. 349, para. 3. 
 136. Id. 
 137. In this sense, Article 349 TFEU, just like all its predecessors, directly borrows 
from the French Constitutional law, where the legal position of the DOM, although 
assimilated into the law of the métropole (France being “une République indivisible,”), can 
be marked by derogations when the latter are needed in order to remedy the specific negative 
factors affecting the development of the DOM. 1958 CONST. 1. So, according to Elisa Paulin 
and Marie-Josèphe Rigobert, “leurs situation outre-mer ne les différencie pas des autres 
collectivités territoriales si ce n’est par l’adaptation de certaine règles à leur situation 
spécifique.” Paulin & Rigobert, supra note 43, at 438. It is thus possible to agree with 
Christian Vitalien that with regard to the legal position of the Ors, “[l]e droit [Français] 
constitutionnel interne et le droit communautaire poursuivent . . . leur coexistence fondée sur 
des logiques interpénétrables.” Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. See also 1958 CONST. 72 (Fr.) 
(“Le régime legislative et l’organisation administrative des Départements d’outre-mer 
peuvent faire l’objet de mesures d’adaptation nécessaires par leurs situation spécifique.”). 
See also 1946 CONST. 73 (Fr.) (“Le régime legislatif des départements d’outre-mer est le 
même que celui des départements métropolitains, sauf exceptions déterminées par la loi.”). 
 138. For the analysis of the corresponding sub-paragraph of EC art. 299, see Brial, 
supra note 5, at 655; Omarjee, supra note 27, at 525–30. 
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B. Article 349 TFEU from a legal-historical perspective 
The ECJ is the guarantor of the right balance to be struck between the 
principle of the maximal possible application of the acquis in the ORs and 
providing sufficient room for derogations in order to deal with the problems 
naturally affecting OR development, as outlined in Article 349(1) TFEU. 
Charged with ensuring that “in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed,”139 the Court has demonstrated quite clearly 
that severe derogations from the acquis will not be tolerated, even if bound 
to the handicaps suffered by the ORs. This is the point that is crucial for the 
understanding of the potential of Article 349 TFEU to generate derogations 
from the letter of the acquis. 
The career of this provision—or, rather, of its predecessors i.e. Articles 
299(2) EC and 227(2) EEC—started with an embarrassment. Having 
provided for the application of the acquis communautaire to the territories 
listed therein, Article 227(2) EEC also set a clear deadline for the adoption 
of specific measures that would lay down the essence of OR status by 
providing specific “conditions of application” of the acquis to such 
regions.140 Simultaneously, the Article also contained a list of core EC law 
provisions to apply to those regions immediately after the entry of the EEC 
Treaty into force.141 This deadline, set on 1 January 1960, was simply 
ignored by the Institutions.  
  
 139. See TEU art. 19(1). 
 140. Note that the text of the article did not allow for non-application of some parts of 
the acquis to the territories with such status and merely allowed for derogations in how the 
acquis was to apply. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. 
 141. EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). Article 227(2) EEC 
reads as follows: 
2. En ce qui concerne l’Algérie et les départements français d’outre-
mer, les dispositions particulières et générales du présent traité 
relatives : 
- à la libre circulation des marchandises, 
- à l’agriculture, à l’exception de l’article 40, paragraphe 4, 
- à la libération des services, 
- aux règles de concurrence, 
- aux mesures de sauvegarde prévues aux articles 108, 109 et  
226, 
- aux institutions, 
sont applicables dès l’entrée en vigueur du présent traité. 
Les conditions d’application des autres dispositions du présent traité 
seront déterminées au plus tard deux ans après son entrée en vigueur, 
par des décisions du Conseil statuant à l’unanimité sur proposition de 
la Commission. 
Les institutions de la Communauté veilleront, dans le cadre des 
procédures prévues par le présent traité et notamment de l’article 
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Such “volontarisme des institutions”142 can be explained, according to 
Jacques Ziller, by the historical circumstances of the time: there was war in 
Algeria.143 Given the prominent status played by Algeria144 and the 
importance in the eyes of the French to incorporate this region into the EEC 
Treaty system in full, it has even been argued that the DOM themselves 
were entirely forgotten at that time due to their relative lack of importance 
compared with Algeria.145 However, missing the deadline would not have 
been as embarrassing if only the Member States and the Institutions had 
been faithful to the main principle established by the Article, and this was 
not the case. Instead of accepting the obvious desire of the drafters 
gradually to incorporate the DOM into the scope of the acquis in full, minor 
derogations notwithstanding, Article 227(2) EEC was interpreted contrary 
to its very purpose as meaning that only the parts of the acquis expressly 
mentioned in the implementing legislation adopted on the basis of this 
article were binding on the DOM, thus going against this provision’s letter 
and spirit.146 It has even been suggested in the literature that “the Institutions 
did not feel bound by Article 227(2) EEC.”147 Consequently, only the core 
of the Common Market applied to the DOM for many years after the 
deadline, rather than the acquis communautaire in full, as a careful reading 
of the text of the Article would demand. 
The situation persisted until 1978, when the ECJ was able to review the 
legality of this regime by answering a preliminary question in the Hansen 
case.148 The case concerned the import of rum from Guadeloupe into 
Germany, where the alcohol of such origin was classified as a product 
  
226, à permettre le développement économique et social de ces 
régions. 
 142. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. Puissochet was also critical of the approach taken 
by the institutions vis-à-vis the ORs. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491-92. 
 143. Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 
supra note 3, at 51. Algeria gained independence from France only in 1962. 
 144. For a discussion on the role played by Algeria in the EEC, see Tavernier, supra 
note 86. 
 145. Moreover, the French approach to Algeria played the leading role in the drafting 
of EEC art. 227(2) in the first place. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 499 n.8. 
 146. Note, however, that this is not how the French government reasoned when 
presenting the EEC Treaty for ratification to the Assemblée Nationale. The French 
government stated back then that “L’unanimité étant requise pour déterminer les conditions 
d’application des dispositions du Traité non encore applicables à l’Algérie et aux DOM, tout 
État membre de la Communauté peut refuser l’extension à l’Algérie et aux DOM des 
dispositions autres que celles énumérées à l’article 227(2)” Id. at 499 n.24. This surprising 
position does not seem to be consistent with EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now 
obsolete). 
 147. Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 
supra note 3, at 51. 
 148. See also Case 58/86, Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons v. 
Receveur des douanes de Saint-Denis, 1987 E.C.R. 1525. See Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & 
O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787. For the 
discussion of the Hansen case, see Puissochet, supra note 27, at 494. 
702 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
coming from outside of the Community and taxed accordingly, rather than 
being exempt from German taxes as alcohol produced in the European part 
of France would have been. The Court stated, unequivocally, that upon the 
expiration of the transitional period, Community law applied to the DOM in 
full: 
In order to make due allowance for the special geographic, economic and 
social situation of those departments, Article 227(2) made provision for 
the Treaty to be applied by stages, and in addition it made available the 
widest powers for the adoption of special provisions commensurate to the 
specific requirements of those parts of the French territories. 
11. For that purpose, Article 227 precisely stated certain chapters and 
articles which were to apply as soon as the Treaty entered into force, while 
at the same time reserving a period of two years within which the Council 
could determine special conditions under which other groups of provisions 
were to apply. 
Therefore after the expiry of that period, the provisions of the Treaty and 
of secondary law must apply automatically to the French overseas 
departments inasmuch as they are an integral part of the French Republic, 
it being understood, however, that it always remains possible subsequently 
to adopt specific measures in order to meet the needs of those territories.149 
The ECJ thus made it absolutely clear that the DOM, by default, fall 
within the geographical scope of application of EU (then Community) law. 
While this clarification amounted to an important step forward compared 
with the pre-Hansen practice of application of Community law to the ORs, 
it did not resolve all the pending issues. Most importantly, while allowing 
for possible derogations from the acquis “to meet the needs of those 
territories,”150 Hansen did not make the limits on the possible extent of such 
derogations entirely clear.151 How far could the Council go in deviating 
from the acquis in legislating on the basis of Article 227(2) EEC? Needless 
to say, this question is also absolutely crucial in the context of the 
application of the current Article 349 TFEU.152 
As the practice of application of the Hansen rule demonstrates,153 the 
Institutions did not feel any constraints on the content of the measures to be 
adopted under Article 227(2) EEC in derogation from the acquis 
  
 149. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10-11. 
 150. Id. ¶ 11. 
 151. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 499. 
 152. The lack of clarity going back to Hansen still affects OR status. See Omarjee, 
supra note 43. 
 153. The core of Hansen has also been restated at the Maastricht IGC with the 
drafting of a Declaration in Annex C. 
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communautaire as long as the measures adopted aimed at remedying “the 
special geographic, economic and social situation of [the ORs].”154 
Adhering to this logic, the Council adopted the POSEI Decisions,155 dealing 
with all the three groups of the ORs, finishing off the framework of the OR 
acquis and introducing derogations from some core principles of the acquis 
communautaire. Illustrative of the importance of these Decisions, they have 
been characterised by the Commission as “the backbone of the policy for 
supporting the outermost regions.”156 
All in all, three POSEI Framework Programmes in the form of Decisions 
have been adopted: POSEIDOM,157 POSEIMA158 and POSEICAN.159 
Moreover, the status of the DOM gained in specificity due to the Dock Dues 
(octroi de mer) Decision160 to allow for a special taxation regime in the 
DOM. A number of secondary law measures have been adopted based on 
the POSEI Programmes, increasing the complexity of the OR acquis.161 
The adoption of the essentially similar POSEIDOM, POSEIMA and 
POSEICAN—albeit adopted using different legal bases, since the Spanish 
and Portuguese territories concerned were not included in the text of Article 
227(2) EEC at the moment of their adoption162—gives rise to claims of 
  
 154. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. 
 155. POSEI stands for “Programme d’Options Spécifiques à l’Éloignement et à 
l’Insularité.” Le Programme POSEI France, POSEI FRANCE.FR, http://www.posei-
france.fr/index.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
 156. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 6. 
 157. Council Decision 89/687/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Establishing a Programme 
of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 1989 O.J. (L 399) 39 (EC) (on the DOM). 
 158. Council Decision 91/315/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of 
Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of Madeira and the Azores (POSEIMA), 
1991 O.J. (L 171) 10 (EC). 
 159. Council Decision 91/314/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of 
Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the Canary Islands (POSEICAN), 1991 
O.J. (L 171) 5 (EC). 
 160. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). For the second extension of 
this Decision (now in force), see Council Decision 2004/162/EC, of 10 February 2004 
Concerning the Dock Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of 
Validity of Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64. For a detailed legal analysis of the 
legality of octroi de mer in the context of EU law, see Slotboom, supra note 64, at 9. See 
also Puissochet, supra note 27, at 504-06. 
 161. More than 700 acts have been adopted under the POSEI Decisions. Commission 
Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 113, at 13, Annex I (listing 
the most important adopted measures). 
 162. Council Decision 89/687/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Establishing a Programme 
of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 1989 O.J. (L 399) 39 (EC), was adopted on the basis of EEC arts. 227(2) & 
235; Council Decision 91/315/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of Options 
Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of Madeira and the Azores (POSEIMA), 1991 O.J. 
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applicability to the ORs of the principle of parallelism. The principle 
presupposes that the situations of all the ORs are essentially similar, making 
elaborate differentiation measures within this group impractical, if not 
illegal. Indeed, the similarity of their permanent handicaps summarised in 
the text of Article 349(1) TFEU, is behind the special status granted to these 
regions in the first place. As formulated by the former conseiller au cabinet 
du secrétaire d’État à l’outre-mer, the principle “a conduit à traiter de 
manière identique les situations comparables des régions 
ultrapériphériques.”163 
The text of Article 227(2) EEC was structurally very differently from 
that of Article 299(2) EC on which the current tandem Articles governing 
OR status, Article 355(1) and 349 TFEU, are based. One of the key 
differences between Articles 227(2) EEC and 299(2) EC was that the text of 
Article 227(2) EEC contained a clear list of provisions that were supposed 
to apply to the ORs (then only DOM) immediately upon the entry into force 
of the EEC Treaty. The Article thus contained a clear list of rules to which 
the two year deadline set in that article did not apply.164 The current legal 
provisions on OR status in the TFEU do not contain any such lists, which 
alters considerably the legal framing of OR status. 
It was when interpreting the secondary legislation adopted under the OR 
Article in force in the light of this list that the ECJ received a chance to 
review the possible extent of derogations from the acquis to be permitted 
when legislating under Article 227(2) EEC. As long as the relevant ECJ 
case law is not overruled, the Treaty provisions currently in force are thus 
indirectly affected by the list of such untouchable elements of the acquis, 
even though it is no longer included in the text of Article 349 TFEU. 
In two leading cases on explaining the extent of possible derogations to 
be granted to the ORs in the context of the list of the areas of the acquis 
which had to apply in the ORs—Legros165 and Lancry166—the Court 
nuanced Hansen, by introducing into its case law an idea of the hierarchy of 
norms within the acquis as applied to the ORs. Having first appeared in the 
  
(L 171) 10 (EC), was adopted on the basis of EEC arts. 43, 113 & 235 and the Spain and 
Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80. Council Decision 91/314/EEC, of 26 June 1991 
Setting up a Programme of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the Canary 
Islands (POSEICAN), 1991 O.J. (L 171) 5 (EC), was adopted on the basis of Council 
Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the Provisions of Community 
Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EC). 
 163. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 125. 
 164. EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). 
 165. Case C 163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 18. See Danielle Perrot, A propos de l’arrêt Legros, réflexions sur le statut 
communautaire des départements français d’outre-mer, 368 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET 
DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 427 (1993). 
 166. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978, ¶ 37. 
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Opinion of AG Jacobs in Legros,167 a very simple argument was accepted by 
the ECJ in Lancry. The ECJ used the list of areas of Community law that 
had to be applicable in the ORs immediately upon the entry into force of the 
EEC Treaty as a clear indication of the overwhelming importance of the 
areas of law mentioned on the list compared with the rest of the acquis.  
The Court found in Lancry that when derogating from the acquis and 
using Article 227(2) EEC as a legal basis the Council could not touch the 
core of the acquis, which is listed in the provision itself: 
37. By expressly authorizing the Council to determine the conditions of 
application only of those Treaty provisions not listed in its first 
subparagraph, Article 227(2) excludes the possibility of derogating from 
the application in the French overseas departments of the provisions which 
are mentioned therein, including those relating to the free-movement of 
goods. To interpret Article 235 of the Treaty as allowing the Council to 
suspend, even temporarily, the application of Articles 9, 12 and 13 of the 
Treaty in the French overseas departments would be to disregard the 
fundamental distinction established by Article 227(2) and to deprive its 
first subparagraph of its effectiveness.168 
By using this line of argument, the ECJ thus went against the core of the 
Dock Dues Decision of the Council.169 The fact that this duty was equally 
applicable to French goods and the goods coming from other Member States 
did not change the nature of the charge, which is a “charge having an effect 
equivalent to a customs duty on imports,”170 thus going against the core 
principle of the free-movement of goods.171 A reference to the article of the 
  
 167. Case C-163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 14 (Opinion of AG Jacobs). The Court refused to follow the conclusion of 
the AG in that case, not ruling on the validity of the Octroi de mer decision and dealing 
solely with the octroi de mer levied preceding its entry into force. 
 168. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978, ¶ 37. 
 169. For an analysis, see also Alina Tryfonidou, The Overseas Application of the 
Customs Duties Provisions of the TFEU, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 221. 
 170. Case C-163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 13. The Court referred to Joined Cases 2/69 & 3/69, Sociaal Fonds voor de 
Diamantarbeiders v. S.A. Ch. Brachfeld & Sons, 1969 E.C.R. 211, to illustrate the meaning 
of the notion of charges having equivalent effect to customs duties. 
 171. See TFEU art. 30. The factual situation in Legros and Lancry was remarkably 
similar to that of other cases decided by the ECJ which involved regional taxes on imported 
goods decided by the ECJ. Without a special regime under EC Treaty art. 299(2) (now TFEU 
art. 349), however, such taxes were virtually impossible to justify. See Joined Cases C-485 & 
486/93, Maria Simitzi v. Dimos Kos, 1995 E.C.R. I-2655. In Simitzi the Court found that “an 
ad valorem charge levied by a Member State on goods imported from another Member State 
by reason of their entry into a region of the first Member State’s territory constitutes a charge 
having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
also levied on goods entering that region from another part of the same State’s territory, and 
notwithstanding the fact that an ad valorem charge is also levied on goods exported from the 
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Treaty prohibiting such charges was in the list in Article 227(2)(2) EEC 
when the cases were decided, which was a clear indication, according both 
to the Court and the Advocate General, that the Council was not empowered 
to derogate from it. 
The logic of the Court is difficult to object to: the Council could not be 
given a carte blanche in its discretion to derogate from the acquis, which, 
according to the first subparagraph of Article 227(2) EEC, had to apply to 
the ORs mentioned therein in full. Moreover, as Marco Slotboom reminds, 
the Member States and the Institutions of the Union are bound to respect the 
principle of the free movement of goods.172 Using the procedures of any 
article of the Treaties in order to undermine it thus goes against the spirit of 
EU law and can be characterised as a violation of the duty of loyalty.173 It is 
clear, however that such a rigid hierarchical approach to the part of the 
acquis intended to be applicable with or without derogations in the ORs 
severely limits the freedom of the Council to legislate with a view to 
diminishing the effects of the handicaps the ORs are said to suffer from. 
Inability to deviate from a number of key areas of the acquis thus threatens 
the achievement of the very objective of the OR instrument in the Treaty—a 
situation which the renewed OR instrument in the Treaties—i.e. Article 
299(2) EC, on which the current Article 349 TFEU is based—was designed 
to remedy. This has been achieved by removing the list of the untouchable 
acquis provisions from the text of the Article. 
An obvious question arising in this regard is how far the reasoning used 
by the Court in Legros and Lancry affects the instruments currently in force, 
especially Article 349 TFEU, which largely inherited the wording of now 
obsolete Article 299(2) EC.174 In order to answer this question, it is first 
necessary to turn to the history of the drafting of this provision. It has been 
suggested in the literature that Article 299(2) EC was amended specifically 
to neutralise the ECJ’s Lancry and Legros case law with a view to returning 
to the vagueness, if not freedom, of Hansen, and thus freeing the hands of 
the Council to modify the application of any part of the acquis whatsoever 
when legislating on the basis of Article 299(2) EC and, consequently, on the 
basis of current Article 349 TFEU. 
Although the interests of the ORs and especially the DOM levying octroi 
de mer are quite clear, they have to be balanced against the goals of the 
  
region in question.” Id. ¶ 17. See also Case C-45/94, Cámara de Comercio, Industria y 
Navegación de Ceuta v. Ayuntamiento de Ceuta, 1995 E.C.R. I-4385. 
 172. Slotboom, supra note 64, at 23. See also Case 37/83, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. 
Direktor der Landwirtschafskammer Rheinland, 1984 E.C.R. 1229, ¶ 18. 
 173. TEU art. 4(3) also applies to Community Institutions. See in relation to their co-
operation with national judicial authorities, Case C-2/88, Imm., J.J. Zwartveld & Others, 
1990 E.C.R. I-4405. 
 174. For an analysis of textual changes see Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas 
Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU 
LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 69; see also Table 1. 
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Treaties as set out in Article 3 TEU and, especially, the idea of the Internal 
Market. In the light of these observations it is highly unlikely that a simple 
removal of the list of immediately effective provisions from a Treaty Article 
responsible for the OR regime could restrain the Court’s willingness to 
defend the coherence of the Union legal order and the Internal Market, to 
which a reference is still provided in Article 349(3) TFEU. If the OR lobby 
was trying to achieve this,175 it was clearly somewhat naïve;176 which is not, 
however, to underestimate the importance of the changes introduced into the 
text of Article 299(2) EC by the Amsterdam revision.177  
  
 175. See Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European 
Territories, supra note 3. In their Declarations adopted during the Amsterdam IGC the 
Presidents of the ORs outlined their position regarding the particularities of the legal status 
they aspired to have under the new Treaty. The declarations make it clear that the ECJ’s 
Lancry and Legros case law was not met with enthusiasm in the ORs. The ultimate feature of 
the post-Amsterdam status had to be the possibility to derogate from any parts of the acquis 
for unlimited periods. This is something that the post-Amsterdam Art. 299(2) EC, just as Art. 
349 TFEU currently in force, clearly does not allow for. See, e.g., the so-called Funchal 
(Madeira) Declaration of 14 March 1996:  
 
Les dispositions du Traité instituant la Communauté européenne et 
du droit dérivé s’appliquent aux Régions ultrapériphériques. 
Toutefois, le Conseil, pour tenir compte des réalités et des 
spécificités de ces régions, adopte des mesures particulières en leur 
faveur et détermine les conditions spéciales de mis en œuvre des 
politiques communes [ . . . ] dans la mesure et aussi longtemps qu’il 
existe un besoin objectif de prendre de telles dispositions. 
 
Brial, supra note 5, at 653 n.54. 
 176. Two days before the Amsterdam summit was expected to approve the text of the 
Amending Treaty, the Presidents of the ORs gathered at Saint-Denis de La Réunion to issue 
a declaration demanding a change in the status of the ORs under the new Treaty. See Brial, 
supra note 5, at 651 n.50 (citing Declaration des presidents des regions ultrapéripheriques, 
Saint-Denis (La Réunion), 17 Apr. 1997). 
 177. The OR lobby was not particularly successful before the Amsterdam IGC. Its 
main achievement in Maastricht was Declaration No. 26 (Declaration on the Outermost 
Regions of the Community), appended to the Maastricht TEU, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 104). 
Numerous elements of that Declaration have been incorporated into the text of EC Treaty art. 
299(2) by the Amsterdam IGC. The Declaration read as follows: 
 
La Conférence reconnaît que les régions ultrapériphériques de la 
Communauté (départements français d’outre-mer, Açores et Madère 
et îles Canaries) subissent un retard structurel important aggravé par 
plusieurs phénomènes (grand éloignement, insularité, faible 
superficie, relief et climat difficile, dépendance économique vis-à-vis 
de quelques produits) dont la constance et le cumul portent 
lourdement préjudice à leur développement économique et 
social.Elle estime que, si les dispositions du traité instituant la 
Communauté européenne et du drpoit dérivé s’appliquent de plein 
droit aux régions ultrapériphériques, il reste possible d’adopter des 
mesures spécifiques en leur faveur dans la mesure et aussi longtemps 
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Probably receptive to this change, the Court sent a signal of 
understanding of the ORs’ special position in Chevassus-Marche178 and 
Sodiprem-SARL,179 which were decided under Article 227(2) EC when the 
new text of Article 299(2) EC has already been drafted and was available 
for consultation by the Court. Making it clear that its earlier case-law stands 
in principle, the ECJ, however, applied it in a somewhat more nuanced way, 
stating that any deviations from the acquis rooted in Article 227(2) EC 
“necessary, proportionate and precisely determined”180 are compatible with 
EU law. This reasoning allowed the Court to rule in Chevassus-Marche that 
exemptions from the octroi de mer of the locally produced goods on 
Réunion were compatible with the Treaty.181 The revolutionary nature of 
this case should not be underestimated: the Court allowed for the first time 
derogation from the principles of Article 90 EC [now Art. 110 TFEU] on 
the basis of the provision granting the ORs their special status.  
Thus, although Article 299(2) EC “pocède à une extension matérielle du 
champ ouvert aux mesures spécifiques,”182 it should be interpreted with 
caution.183 The specific list of provisions of the Treaty immediately 
applicable to the ORs having been removed from the Treaty Article 
establishing OR status, radical change in the interpretation of the essence of 
the status was highly unlikely, which has been confirmed in practice. This 
was particularly true, given the strict wording of the last paragraph of the 
relevant Treaty provision, prohibiting the Council from undermining the 
“coherence of the Union legal order, including the internal market and 
common policies.”184 To summarise, although the present version of the 
  
qu’il existe un besoin objectif de prendre de telles mesures en vue 
d’un développement économique et social de ces régions. Ces 
mesures doivent viser à la fois l’objectif de l’achèvement du marché 
intérieur et celui d’une reconnaissance de la réalité régionale en vue 
de permettre à ces régions de rattraper le niveau économique et 
social moyen de la Communauté. 
 
For an account of the ORs’ lobbying activities in Brussels see Janus, supra note 71. 
 178. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743. Before this case was decided, scholars tended to regard the regime approved by 
the Court as being contrary to Community Law, as it clearly deviated from the main 
principles of the Internal Market. Slotboom, supra note 64, at 23. 
 179. Joined Cases C-37 & 38/96, Sodiprem SARL & Others v. Direction Générale des 
Douanes, 1998 E.C.R. I-2039. For an informative summary of the development of the octroi 
de mer case-law of the ECJ, see Case C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés v. Ministre des Fin., 
1996 E.C.R. I-5647. 
 180. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 49. 
 181. Id. ¶ 53. 
 182. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 121. For a similar position see Omarjee, supra note 
27, at 518. 
 183. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 525. 
 184. TFEU art. 349, para. 3. 
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Article seemingly grants the ORs more room to accommodate their 
specificity better within the EU legal order compared to the OR instrument 
in the EEC Treaty, the far-reaching structural derogations from the acquis 
which are only nominally connected with the “handicaps” listed in Article 
349(1) TFEU are highly unlikely to be pronounced legal by the Court. In 
other words, agreeing with Fabien Brial, “de nombreuses incertitudes 
subsistent”185—a conclusion also reached by Ismaël Omarjee.186 At the same 
time, it would not be right to deny the fact that certain clarity is established 
by Chevassus-Marche and Sodiprem-SARL case law, demonstrating that 
derogations are likely not to infringe the coherence of the EU legal order as 
long as they are clearly necessary and strictly construed. 
The story presented demonstrates that there is a constant movement from 
a more to a less restrictive vision of flexibility in the way the acquis is to be 
applied in the ORs. The removal of the untouchable list from the text of the 
relevant Treaty instrument is a great illustration of this process. More 
importantly, however, the Treaty of Lisbon altered the OR Article of the 
Treaty so that the strict restatement of the main principle that the acquis 
applies in the ORs in full has disappeared from the text. To state, as Article 
355(1) TFEU does, that the Treaty is to apply to the ORs “in accordance 
with Article 349 [TFEU]”187 can only be viewed as the continuation of the 
trend leading towards the relaxation of the strict approach to the acquis 
necessarily applicable in the ORs established by the ECJ in Hansen. In the 
long run, should this trend continue, it is likely to result in an increase in the 
convergence of the main legal statuses granted to the Overseas in EU law, 
moving the ORs closer to the status enjoyed by the OCTs. This process has 
started on a number of fronts and is only likely to continue with renewed 
intensity. 
C.  Article 349 TFEU as a source of derogations 
To use Article 349(1) TFEU as a legal basis, the Council is required to 
follow the special legislative procedure described in the Article,188 which 
requires the Council to act by qualified majority voting (QMV)189 on a 
proposal of the Commission after having consulted the European 
Parliament. In fact, it is a restatement of the procedure contained in the 
  
 185. Brial, supra note 27, at 652. 
 186. Omarjee, supra note 43. 
 187. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 188. See also TFEU art. 289(2) (restating the rules of the special legislative 
procedure). See Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 
supra note 27, at 731-36 (describing the speculation as to why TFEU art. 249 actually 
repeats TFEU art. 203 rules besides simply naming the legislative procedure in question). 
 189. TEU art. 16(3) applies since TFEU art. 349, para. 1 does not provide otherwise. 
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previous version of the Article—Article 299(2) EC.190 If we take one step 
back, it is clear that the last serious improvement brought into the OR 
derogations procedure was when Article 227(2) EC was scrapped. The latter 
required unanimity and thus was left open for any Member State to block 
the adoption of specific measures to meet the needs of the ORs. Ismaël 
Omarjee is right to point out that this possibility is not purely hypothetical, 
referring to the numerous steps taken by Germany to block special measures 
regarding the banana market.191 At the same time, if the contemporary QMV 
rules are compared to the unanimity of pre-Amsterdam times, especially 
since the number of Member States in charge of ORs has not grown at all, it 
becomes clear that QMV might not be very easy to reach either, something 
Danielle Perrot also underlined in her analysis of Article 349(1) TFEU.192 
The outcomes of the employment of the special legislative procedure of 
Article 349 TFEU only concern the application of EU law in the territories 
of a minority of the Member States. The Treaty provision does not introduce 
any qualifications to the QMV rule to reflect this reality, though it is 
possible to imagine that no measure would be adopted under the Article 
against the will of the Member State exercising sovereignty over an OR 
whose status is at stake.193 Moreover, ideally, the OR in question itself 
should be consulted as well, although no binding legal provision to this 
effect is to be found anywhere in the acquis. 
The question whether the procedure described in Article 349 TFEU will 
always be used by the Institutions remains open, however, since the choice 
of the procedure concerns the nature of Article 349(1) TFEU as a legal 
basis. Given that cumulative legal bases are not uncommon in EU law and 
that the procedures associated with different legal bases frequently vary, 
especially in derogating from the special legislative procedure, a de facto 
different procedure for the introduction of Article 349 TFEU derogations 
will often be used. 
To provide some examples, and given that Article 349 TFEU is still very 
new, the history of the employment of Article 299(2) EC as a legal basis for 
derogations in favour of the ORs needs to be considered. Parallels with 
Article 299(2) EC will obviously hold, since the procedures contained in 
  
 190. For the analysis of the contemporary wording see for example Ziller, supra note 
5; Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 
27. For an analysis of the procedure in EC art. 299(2), see, e.g., Omarjee, supra note 27, at 
520-23. 
 191. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 520. 
 192. Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 
supra note 27, at 732. 
 193. See also Omarjee, supra note 27, at 521. There is a perception in the literature 
that the theoretical possibility of such an outcome has increased with the last rounds of 
enlargement. No evidence is provided, however, except for the simple growth in the number 
of Member States. See, e.g., Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 
154. 
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both provisions are identical and also since the rules on cumulative legal 
bases have not changed with the Treaty of Lisbon amendments. 
Although Article 299(2) EC has been used as a legal basis for the 
derogations in favour of the ORs on numerous occasions,194 equally 
numerous are the examples of the employment of the old versions of Article 
349(1) TFEU in cumulative legal bases. The analysis of the practice of 
application of Article 227(2) EC as a legal basis demonstrates, for instance, 
that before this provision became Article 299(2) EC, the Institutions were 
very eager indeed to use it in conjunction with some other legal basis from 
the EC Treaty. So the Dock Dues Decision 89/688/EEC had a double legal 
basis: both Article 227(2) EC and the former Article 235 EC195 were used.196 
Given such practice, scholars even started questioning the capacity of the 
predecessors of Article 349(1) TFEU to serve as free-standing legal bases 
for derogations from the acquis to be applied to the ORs.197 While the 
ability of the OR provision in the Treaties to provide a unique legal basis for 
derogations has already been demonstrated, it is clear that a cumulative 
legal basis is often preferred and this is unlikely to change in the future. 
Based on an analysis of the employment of Article 299(2) EC, it can be 
concluded that the Commission seems to be of the opinion that a special 
provision authorising derogations from the acquis to meet the needs of the 
ORs can only be used as a unique legal basis when no other article able to 
supply such legal basis is available in the Treaty.198 
A good example of the practical implications of this finding is 
Regulation (EC) 1447/2001 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds,199 which was 
adopted on the basis of two articles: Article 299(2) EC and Article 161 
EC.200 The consequences of such a double legal basis are far-reaching. 
Given that the Article 299(2) EC procedure required QMV and Article 161 
EC contained a requirement for unanimity, the stricter procedure was used, 
which in practice resulted in the application of stricter voting requirements 
  
 194. See, e.g., Council Decision 2004/162, of 10 February 2004 Concerning the Dock 
Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of Decision 
89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64 (EC); Council Decision 2002/546, of 20 June 2002 on the 
AIEM Tax Applicable in the Canary Islands, 2002 O.J. (L 179) 22 (EC). 
 195. TFEU art. 352 (formerly Art. 308 EC in post-Amsterdam numbering).  
 196. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, pmbl., 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). 
 197. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 123-24. 
 198. For academic support of such a position, see Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 
paragraphe 2, supra note 27, at 145, 147. 
 199. Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 2001 Amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 
(EC). See Vitalien, supra note 43, at 123-24. 
 200. Now TFEU art. 171; Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 2001 Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, 
pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC). 
712 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
than would have been necessary had Article 299(2) EC been used as a free-
standing legal basis. Although Article 161 EC became Article 171 TFEU, 
which also entailed a change in the procedure required, since the most 
commonly used procedure in the Treaties is the ordinary one, it is expected 
that the European Parliament will be playing a much more important role in 
framing the derogations from the acquis to apply in the ORs than what 
Article 349(1) TFEU seems to suggest. Article 171 TFEU also now contains 
a requirement to use an ordinary legislative procedure.201 
All in all, the practice of cumulation of legal bases can thus make the 
adoption of acts under Article 349(1) TFEU more difficult.202 In this 
context, it may be reasonable to consider changing the current practice of 
applying provisions responsible for the shaping of the OR acquis. Indeed, 
neither the text of Article 349 TFEU nor the way the Article and its 
predecessors have been interpreted by the ECJ provide reasons for believing 
that the institutions are right in not using it as a free-standing legal basis, 
even if there is an apparent overlap with other treaty provisions. The 
position embraced by Jean-Pierre Puissochet is very instructive in this 
regard. He interpreted the silence of the Court in Chevassus-Marche about 
any other legal bases for the Dock Dues Decision besides Article 299(2)EC 
as a clear indication of the irrelevance of the additional legal basis.203  
Although put in place to deal with permanent handicaps, the derogations 
from the acquis under Article 349 TFEU cannot be permanent in nature. 
This provision thus cannot be viewed as being exempt from the main 
principles of EU law governing the employment of derogations: they have 
to be construed as strictly as possible, be proportionate to the stated goals 
and be temporary. Agreeing with Ismaël Omarjee on this point, it is clear 
that “la possibilité permanente d’adopter des mesures spécifiques ne signifie 
pas forcément la permanence de ces mesures.”204 However, the extension of 
previously granted derogations is obviously possible. 
In practice, the Commission has historically played a leading role in the 
implementation of the Treaty articles responsible for the introduction and 
the extension of the derogations from the acquis in favour of the ORs. Upon 
the request of the European Council,205 the Commission submits general 
  
 201. It has to be borne in mind, however, that TEU art. 48(7), para. 2 allows for a 
simplified Treaty amendment to replace special legislative procedures with ordinary ones. 
Should TFEU art. 349, para. 1 demonstrate that, in practice, the accumulation of legal basis 
mostly results in the application of the ordinary legislative procedure, it would make sense to 
make use of TEU art. 48(7), para. 2 in order to bridge the gap between the reality of OR 
regulation and the text of TFEU art. 349, para. 1. 
 202. See also Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 734-35. 
 203. The second legal basis was EC Treaty art. 308 (as in effect 2007) (now TFEU art. 
352). See Puissochet, supra note 27, at 506. 
 204. The declaration is quoted in full in Omarjee, supra note 27, at 520. 
 205. So the 1999 Cologne European Council invited the Commission “to submit to the 
Council by the end of 1999 a report identifying a package of measures to implement the 
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reports on the measures designed to ensure the application of the OR 
provision of the Treaty, analysing the opportunities the acquis offers to deal 
with the natural handicaps of the ORs.206 The reports are “built on global, 
coherent approach to the special characteristics of the [situation of the ORs] 
and to way[s] of addressing them.”207 Such analysis is conducted in close 
cooperation and partnership with the authorities of the Member States 
concerned and of the ORs themselves,208 so that the Commission has access 
to the most up-to-date information in drafting its reports. 
Along with the general strategic reports, the Commission also releases 
progress reports that assess the effect of the special measures already 
adopted on the basis of Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors.209 Such 
reports cover all the steps taken by the Commission towards using the 
possibilities offered by the treaties to remedy the permanent handicaps 
which the ORs suffer from. Thus, the Commission is there to provide 
general policy guidelines, which are then incorporated into the proposals it 
submits to the Council legislating on the basis of Article 349 TFEU. The 
2004 Communication on the Stronger Partnership with the Outermost 
Regions210 outlined the key aspects of future development of the outermost 
regions acquis. These are competitiveness, access and offsetting of other 
constraints, and integration into the regional area211—the main fields to 
mark the use of Article 349 TFEU in the near future. 
  
provisions of Article 299(2) of the EC Treaty with regard to the outermost regions”: 
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, E.U. BULL., no. 6, ¶ 38 (1999). See also 
Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, E.U. BULL., no. 6, ¶ 58 (2002) 
[hereinafter Seville European Council]. 
 206. See e.g., Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra 
note 113; Communication from the Commission: A Stronger Partnership for the Outermost 
Regions, COM (2004) 343 final (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Commission Communication on 
Partnership for Outermost Regions]. These should not be confused with the Reports 
regularly submitted by the Commission on the progress made in implementation of POSEI 
programmes. See, e.g., Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament in Accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91, Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament in Accordance with Article 35 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1600/92, Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament in Accordance with Article 30 of Regulation (EEC) No 1601/92, COM 
(2000) 790 final (Nov. 29, 2000). 
 207. Seville European Council, supra note 205, ¶ 58. 
 208. See, e.g., Answer of Mr. Prodi on Behalf of the Commission to the Written 
Question P-224/00 by Carlos Costa Neves to the Commission (Jan. 3,1 2000) Regarding 
Commission Report on the Application of Article 299(2) of the Treaty, 2000 O.J. (303) 163 
E. The input from the ORs is acknowledged in the Commission’s Reports. See, e.g., 
Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 113, at 5-6. 
 209. See, e.g., Report from the Commission on Implementation of Article 299(2) of the 
EC Treaty; Measures to Assist the Outermost Regions, COM (2002) 723 final (Dec. 19, 
2002) [hereinafter Report on the Implementation of Article 299(2)]. 
 210. Commission Communication on Partnership for Outermost Regions, supra note 
206. 
 211. Id. at 4. 
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D. Examples of Derogations Enjoyed by the ORs 
The POSEI programmes and further legislation focus on derogations in a 
number of fields, mostly concentrating on: agriculture; fisheries; taxation; 
customs; state aids; aid to small businesses, craft firms and tourism; energy; 
transport; research and development; the information society; environment; 
and regional cooperation.212 The broad coverage of areas by specific 
measures does not mean, however, that the derogations in question 
necessarily substantially alter the norms of the acquis applicable to the ORs 
in all the areas mentioned. The intensity of derogations varies to a great 
degree. While in some fields, such as taxation, derogations are quite far-
reaching,213 in others, such as research and development, there is virtually 
nothing available in terms of specific measures targeting the handicaps the 
ORs suffer from. In its Report on a Stronger Partnership for the Outermost 
Regions214 the Commission expressed concerns with the practical 
functioning of some of the derogations. The acquis applicable to the ORs in 
the areas of the environment, transport, and the Internal Market has been 
particularly characterised as failing to “take adequate account of the special 
features of the [outermost] regions.”215 Clearly, there is room for 
improvement in the way Article 349 TFEU is employed. 
To illustrate the depth of derogations from the acquis in favour of the 
ORs, several examples can be provided. The derogations in the field of 
agriculture216 thus concern the special measures regarding the traditional 
  
 212. For further analysis of TFEU art. 249(2) as a source of derogations see Omarjee, 
supra note 43, at 126. TFEU art. 349, para. 2 contains its own list of the main areas where 
the derogations from the acquis are most likely. It mentions that “in particular areas such as 
customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, 
conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Union programmes.” Id. 
 213. See Kochenov, supra note 3, at 282-85. 
 214. Commission Communication on Partnership for Outermost Regions, supra note 
206. 
 215. Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 216. See, e.g., Council Regulations (EC) 1452/2001 (POSEIDOM); 1453/2001 
(POSEIMA); See, e.g., Council Regulations 1452/2001, of 28 June 2001 Introducing 
Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 11 (EC); Council Regulation 1453/2001, of 28 June 2001 
Introducing Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the Azores and Madeira 
(POSEIMA), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 26 (EC); Council Regulation 1454/2001, of 28 June 2001 
Introducing Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the Canary Islands 
(POSEICAN), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 45 (EC); Council Regulation 1455/2001, of 28 June 
2001Amending Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 on the Common Organisation of the Market 
in Beef and Veal, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 58 (EC); Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 
2001 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 and Laying Down General Provisions on the 
Structural Funds, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC); Council Regulation (EC) 1455/2001 of 28 June 
2001 [2001] OJ L 198/54; Council Regulation (EC) 1447/2001 of 28 June 2001 [2001] OJ L 
198. 
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products of the ORs, especially rice, sugar, pineapples, and bananas.217 
These measures aim to guarantee production and prices. They also concern 
compensatory aid for production and the import of such products, especially 
bananas, from the third-countries.218 The second most important aspect 
related to the special measures in the field of agriculture concern the 
establishment of a system of specific supply arrangements. The 
Commission summarised the system as follows: 
Each marketing year, a forecast supply balance is adopted for agricultural 
products necessary for human consumption and local processing. . . . 
Imports originating outside the Community are exempt from customs 
duties, while supplies or products originating in the Community benefit 
from aid equivalent to the benefit arising from this exemption.  
The aim of this measure is to offset the additional costs arising as a result 
of remoteness and isolation and to bring down prices for end users by 
promoting competition between sources of supply. . . . 
Products benefiting from the arrangements may not be re-exported to third 
countries or redispatched to the rest of the Community. However, where 
they are processed in the region concerned, this ban does not apply to 
traditional exports or shipments to the rest of the Community within given 
limits.219 
In the field of fisheries, when scrutinising state aid to the fisheries sector, 
the Commission uses guidelines specifically referring to the special position 
enjoyed by the ORs given the handicaps they suffer from.220 A special 
system of compensation for the additional costs incurred as a result of the 
remoteness for the marketing of the fisheries products from the ORs permits 
special treatment of these regions. The system is extended regularly based 
  
 217. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 13. 
 218. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2587/2001, of 19 December 2001 Amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas, 2001 
O.J. (L 345) 13 (EC) (introducing tariff system). 
 219. Id. at 14. 
 220. Guidelines for the Examination of State Aid to Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2001 
O.J. (C 19) 7. Section 2.9.5 of the Guidelines allows for a special regime of aid granted in the 
ORs:  
 
Aid designed to meet the needs of outermost regions will be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the provisions of Article 
299(2) of the EC Treaty [now TFEU art. 349] and the compatibility 
of the measures concerned with the objectives of the common 
fisheries policy and the potential effect of the measures on 
competition in these regions and in the other parts of the [Union].  
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on Commission assessments.221 The present instrument for “offsetting the 
additional costs for the marketing of certain fishery products”222 will apply 
until 2013.223 As is the case with all the measures adopted on the basis of 
Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors, extension will be possible if needed 
for dealing with the permanent handicaps described in the Article. 
Similarly to the aid to the fisheries industry, the concept of remoteness 
has been incorporated into the Guidelines on National Regional Aid, 
providing for more favourable rules on the assessment of the compatibility 
of such aid with the Internal Market,224 which is now reflected in the 
Treaties.225 
Special customs duties regimes applicable in the ORs allow for 
exemptions from customs duties of certain products able to assist the ORs in 
dealing with the permanent handicaps. The duties on the import to Canary 
Islands of goods for capital investment and raw materials for maintenance 
and processing and fisheries products are thus suspended until 31 December 
2011.226 The case of the Canary Islands is in no way exceptional among the 
ORs. In its Report the Commission specified that it is:  
[w]illing to consider any other request for customs measures to assist the 
outermost regions and designed to offset the effects of trade policy 
towards non-member countries, particularly those bordering on the 
outermost regions, as long as such measures comply with the limits set out 
in Article 299(2) of the Treaty [now Art. 349 TFEU].227 
In the area of transport, the ports of the ORs are automatically regarded 
as “of common interest and form part of the trans-European network” and 
are thus eligible for finance from the Cohesion fund.228 In addition to the 
funding for ports, the possibility to impose public service obligations on the 
  
 221. For the latest Regulation adopted in this context, see Council Regulation 
791/2007, of 21 May 2007 Introducing a Scheme to Compensate for the Additional Costs 
Incurred in the Marketing of Certain Fishery Products from the Outermost Regions the 
Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, French Guiana and Réunion, 2007 O.J. (L 176) 1 (EC). 
 222. Id. at pmbl. 
 223. Id. art. 14. 
 224. Amendments to the Guidelines on National Regional Aid, 2000 O.J. (C 258) 5. 
 225. TFEU art. 107(3)(a). 
 226. Council Regulation 704/2002, Temporary Suspending Autonomous Common 
Customs Tariff Duties on Imports of Certain Industrial Products and Opening and Providing 
for the Administration of Autonomous Community Tariff Quotas on Imports of Certain 
Fishery Products into the Canary Islands, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 111) 1, 3 (EC). 
 227. Report on the Implementation of Article 299(2), supra note 209, at 8.  
 228. Decision 1346/2001, Amending Decision No 1692/96/EC as Regards Seaports, 
Inland Ports and Intermodal Terminals as well as Project No. 8 in Annex III, 2001 O.J. (L 
185) 1. 
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scheduled services to the airports serving outermost regions has also 
benefited the accessibility of these regions.229 
All in all, special measures rooted in Article 349 TFEU are absolutely 
necessary to make OR status work to the benefit of the territories concerned. 
Although the Article does not provide any time limits for derogations, each 
of them should be limited in time. Such limitation does not mean, however, 
that the derogations should necessarily cease to apply upon the expiry of the 
time-limit concerned. All the instruments introducing special measures 
derogating from the acquis based on Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors 
require regular reassessment of the situation in each sector, which normally 
leads to the prolongation of the derogations, giving them at least de facto 
quasi-permanence. 
The regulation of the legal position of the ORs in EU law is a very 
dynamic field, which is bound to follow the developments in the regions 
concerned. The recent negative to positive change in the approach endorsed 
by the EU with respect to the Overseas in general and the ORs in particular, 
leaves room for optimism that Article 349 TFEU will be used in the best 
possible way to attune the acquis to the specificity of these regions. 
III. OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES IN THE EU LAW OF THE 
OVERSEAS 
The OCTs in the sense of Article 355(2) TFEU (formerly Art. 299(3) 
EC) are only those countries and territories associated with the EU 
mentioned in Annex II TFEU.230 Clarifying the status of these territories in 
EU law, Article 355(2) TFEU states that “special arrangements for 
association set out in Part Four [TFEU] shall apply to the overseas countries 
and territories listed in Annex II.”231 Part IV TFEU232 contains a number of 
  
 229. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 22-23. 
 230. TFEU Annex II includes the following: Danish, French and the Netherlands 
territories and the territories under the sovereignty of the UK: Greenland; New Caledonia; 
French Polynesia; Wallis-and-Futuna; Mayotte; Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon; French Austral 
and Antarctic Territory; Aruba; the Netherlands Antilles (now divided into five separate 
entities separately included in the Annex. i.e. Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustasius and Sint 
Maarten); Anguilla; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Montserrat; the Turks and 
Caicos Islands; the Falkland Islands; Saint Helena and its Dependencies; British Indian 
Ocean Territory (Chagos archipelago); Pitcairn; the South Sandwich Islands and Southern 
Georgia; British Antarctic Territory; and the Bermuda Islands. On the situation of the OCTs 
vis-à-vis EU law in their evolution see generally Custos, supra note 11; ZILLER, LES DOM-
TOM, supra note 27. For the initial French perspective, see J.L. Gautron, La situation des 
DOM et des TOM au regard de la CEE, 3 ANNUAIRE DU TIERS MONDE 141. A number of the 
overseas territories and regions of the UK not included in the list and not specifically referred 
to in TFEU art. 355 are, by virtue of TFEU art. 355(2), para. 2, totally excluded from the 
scope of the Treaties—thus unable to claim OCT or any other status in EU law. 
 231. TFEU art. 355(2). 
 232. TFEU arts. 198–204. 
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provisions specifying the limits of the application of the core of the Internal 
Market acquis in the OCTs, as well as providing a legal basis under Article 
203 TFEU for designing and managing further rules of association.  
It is important in this regard not to confuse the association of the OCTs 
with the EU and the association agreements concluded with the third 
countries, since the OCTs’ association merely refers to a system of 
secondary EU law which governs the specific rules of application of EU law 
in the territories listed in Annex II TFEU. Consequently, the OCTs’ 
association does not entail any negotiations or the signing of any 
agreements with the OCTs themselves. All the day-to-day rules of 
association are stated in a Decision adopted on the basis of Article 203 
TFEU, which simply requires the Council to act unanimously on the 
proposal of the Commission—no negotiations, diplomatic games, and 
ratifications are required.233 
A. The Main Rules of Association 
Part IV TFEU established the main rules of association. In the opening 
article of this part,234 the goals of association are outlined in the following 
terms: 
The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close 
economic relations between them and the Union as a whole.235 
In accordance with the principles set out in the preamble to this Treaty, 
association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of 
the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the 
economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire.236 
The association regime is currently governed by Council Decision 
2001/822/EC237 —adopted on the basis of Article 187 EC (now Article 203 
TFEU)—and Secondary law adopted on the basis of this decision.238 
  
 233. The OCTs are united in the Overseas Countries and Territories Association 
(OCTA), which might provide an opportunity for their voice to be heard, should such games 
be required. For an analysis, see Baetens, supra note 71, at 383. 
 234. TFEU art. 198. 
 235. TFEU art. 198, para. 2. 
 236. TFEU art. 198, para. 3. 
 237. Council Decision 2001/822, On the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Community, 2001 O.J. (L 314) 1 (EC). For a commentary see 
Ziller, Les outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la mondialisation—L’association 
des pays et territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté européenne, supra note 44, at 133, 134. 
 238. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1424/2007, Amending Regulation (EC) No 
2304/2002 Implementing Council Decision 2001/822/EC on the Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories with the European Community and Allocating the Indicative 
Amounts under the 10th European Development Fund, 2007 O.J. (L 317) 38 (EC). 
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Part IV TFEU provides for a number of important principles guiding the 
association. The asymmetry in the EU–OCTs relationship emerges as the 
key element of Part IV TFEU regime. The relations between the Union and 
the OCTs associated with it are far from equal—preference always being 
given to the OCTs—which can be illustrated by a number of examples, 
ranging from free movement of goods to free movement of persons. 
Therefore, while the “Member States . . . apply to their trade with the 
countries and territories the same treatment as they accord each other 
pursuant to the Treaties,”239 the OCTs merely “apply to [their] trade with the 
Member States and with the other countries and territories the same 
treatment as that which [is] applie[d] to the European State with which it 
has its special relations.”240 Consequently, while the “[c]ustoms duties on 
imports into the Member States of goods originating in the countries and 
territories [are] prohibited,”241 the OCTs themselves are empowered to “levy 
customs duties which meet the needs of their development and 
industrialisation or produce revenue for their budgets.”242 The latter 
freedom is limited by the principle of non-discrimination,243 since such 
duties “may not exceed the level of those imposed on imports of products 
from the Member State with which each country or territory has special 
relations.”244 The ECJ explained that “although the OCTs are countries and 
territories which have special links with the [EU], they do not, however, 
form part of the [Union], and free-movement of goods between the OCTs 
and the Community does not exist unrestrictedly at this stage.”245 As a result 
of this approach, the OCTs enjoy much more freedom in economic affairs 
than the ORs. In one example, unlike the ORs, the OCTs were allowed 
more flexibility in the field of taxation and had no trouble levying octroi de 
mer-like taxes.246  
  
 239. TFEU art. 199(1). This provision does not mean, however, that unrestricted free-
movement of goods exists between the Union and the OCTs. See generally Tryfonidou, 
supra note 169. See also Cees T. Dekker, The Ambit of the Free Movement of Goods under 
the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, 23 EUR. L. REV. 272 (1998); R.H. 
Lauwaars & M.C.E.J. Bronckers, Passen communautaire origineregels in het handelsverkeer 
met de Landen en Gebieden Overzee?, in MET HET OOG OP EUROPA: DE EUROPESE 
GEMEENSCHAP, DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN ARUBA 34 (1991). 
 240. TFEU art. 199(2). 
 241. TFEU art. 200(1). In practice, however, this prohibition is not absolute, since 
“originating” can know restrictive interpretations. See Case C-310/95, Road Air BV v. 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1997 E.C.R. I-2229. 
 242. TFEU art. 200(3) (emphasis added). But see TFEU art. 200(2) (“Customs duties 
on imports into each country or territory form Member States or from the other countries or 
territories shall be prohibited in accordance with the provisions of Article 30.”). 
 243. Both direct and indirect discrimination “either in law or in fact” between imports 
from various Member States is prohibited. TFEU art. 200(5). 
 244. TFEU art. 200(3), para. 2. 
 245. Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 36. 
 246. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643. Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 149. 
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As far as the free movement of persons goes, it only applies to the 
movement of EU citizens from the OCTs to the EU, not vice versa.247 This 
provides another example of asymmetry in the EU–OCT interaction 
according to the current OCT acquis. Freedom of establishment does 
apply.248 While derogations are theoretically possible under Article 203 
TFEU, as long as they are adopted by the Council unanimously and are 
grounded in the principles of the treaties,249 such derogations will only apply 
in the OCTs, not in the EU in Europe, which means that the same 
asymmetry observations valid in the context of free movement of persons 
and goods apply to establishment in the same way. 
B. ECJ out of line with the spirit of the law? 
Although the position of the Court interpreting the essence of the OCTs’ 
association with the EU is very restrictive—its oft-repeated standpoint 
consists in underlining the position that “failing express provisions, the 
general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to [such] countries and 
territories”250—this is likely to change. 
In addition to the obvious message stemming from the fact that the 
Treaties are silent on any “principle of non-application” of the general EU 
acquis in the OCTs, an academic consensus championed by Jacques Ziller251 
to treat Article 355(2) TFEU and Part IV TFEU as lex specialis vis-à-vis the 
rules found elsewhere in the Treaties—not as all the law applicable to the 
OCTs252—has been arrived at, as exemplified above.253 The reasons to be 
suspicious of the sustainability of the Court’s approach are numerous and 
  
 247. For the analysis of this issue, see Kochenov, supra note 29, at 211. 
 248. TFEU art. 199(5). The provision contains a direct reference to the provisions of 
the mainstream acquis allowing for derogations on the basis of TFEU art. 203. For an 
analysis of this freedom see Iris Goldner Lang and Tamara Perišin, Free Movement of 
Services and Establishment in the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 
179; Daniël S. Smit, The Position of the EU Member States’ Associated and Dependent 
Territories Under the Freedom of Establishment, the Free Movement of Capital and 
Secondary EU Law in the Field of Company Taxation, 39 INTERTAX 40 (2011). 
 249. TFEU art. 203; Joined Cases T-480 & 483/93, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. 
Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-2305, ¶¶ 92-93. 
 250. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643, ¶ 10; Case C-
110/97, Netherlands v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 49; Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger 
v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. 
 251. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
See also Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ Territories, supra 
note 11, at 119 (arguing in this direction well before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon). 
 252. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
 253. See supra Part II. 
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vary from the obvious conclusions to be drawn from the careful reading of 
the text of Article 355(2) TFEU to taking into account the logic of the 
integrated approach to territory, embraced by the Treaty of Lisbon through 
Article 52 TEU, as well as the need to pay due regard to the history of the 
OCT status254 and the interplay between the scopes ratione loci and ratione 
personae explored elsewhere.255 These factors point to the fact that the 
position currently embraced by the ECJ not only fails to capture the current 
state of affairs in OCT–EU relationship—as much more EU law de facto 
applies to their association than is contained in Part IV TFEU—but is also 
hardly faithful to the spirit of the law. 
Therefore, although seemingly falling outside the scope of the 
mainstream EU acquis—which is the only conclusion to be made based on 
the unequivocal language of the ECJ—the OCTs are nevertheless under 
growing EU law influence. This is the case not so much because of the 
wording of Part IV TFEU, which applies to them according to Article 
355(2) TFEU, but simply by virtue of the very composition of the EU legal 
system. In other words, agreeing with Jacques Ziller, only Part III TFEU 
will not apply to them.256 Only the general euro-acquis would be an obvious 
exception.257 
The Eurafrica-inspired rationale behind the creation of this special group 
of territories was to exclude them, for a time at least, from the effects of the 
Internal Market. Consequently, in accordance with Article 3 of the Customs 
Code258 they are not part of the Customs Territory of the Union. The 
application of the other parts of the acquis is growing on a constant basis. In 
Antillean Rice Mills, the CFI (then the Court of the First Instance, now the 
General Court) acknowledged that the regime of association is not shaped 
exclusively by the rules of Part IV TFEU (then the EC) and stated that the 
general principles of European law and the objectives of integration should 
apply equally to the OCT association regime.259 The judges stressed that 
“the reference to the ‘principles set out in this Treaty’ is not merely to the 
principles set out in Part Four of the Treaty but to all the principles set out 
in the Treaty, in particular those listed in Part One, entitled ‘Principles.’”260 
The ECJ concurred.261 Interpreting the association described in Part IV 
  
 254. See Custos, supra note 11. 
 255. See Kochenov, supra note 29. 
 256. Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ Territories, supra 
note 11, at 119. See also discussion supra Part II. 
 257. See Fabian Amtenbrink, EMU and the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, 
supra note 5, at 271. 
 258. Council Regulation 2913/92, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 3 (EEC) (as amended). 
 259. TFEU art. 203 makes a direct reference to “the principles set out in the Treaties.” 
 260. Joined Cases T-480 & 483/93, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. 
II-2305, ¶¶ 92-93. 
 261. Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 37 
(explaining that when adopting Decisions shaping the association, the Council is supposed to 
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TFEU in a legal vacuum and out of the context of the general principles 
contained in the EU and TFEU Treaties and unwritten principles of law 
would be counter-productive and legally unsound, since Part IV TFEU is 
engrained in the coherent system of EU law, forming an organic part of an 
infinitely more complicated whole which cannot be dismissed as irrelevant 
without threatening to undermine the essence of association. 
Moreover, going beyond the general principles of EU law, as a 
consequence of the fact that the absolute majority of the OCTs’ inhabitants 
are European citizens,262 the scope of EU law applicable to these territories 
is much greater that what Part IV TFEU describes.263 This is because all the 
limitations of the scope of EU law imposed by Article 355 TFEU are 
uniquely territorial in nature and cannot be construed as capable of also 
restraining the personal scope of the law. In other words, not limited by 
Article 355 TFEU, the scope ratione personae of EU law plays the key role 
in the EU Law of the Overseas, including the acquis regulating the OCT 
status.264 Consequently, Part II TFEU (Non-Discrimination and Citizenship 
of the Union), which applies to persons and has only an indirect link with 
territory,265 applies also in the OCTs, as clarified by the ECJ in Eman en 
Sevinger.266 Other Parts of the Treaties also obviously apply—and it is 
absolutely necessary, sooner or later, to admit this reality. No reference 
from Part IV TFEU is needed for the provisions on Institutions (Title III 
TEU, Part VI TFEU) or for Part VII TFEU on the General and Final 
Provisions to govern, even if indirectly, the legal position of the OCTs. 
Indeed, to take the Institutions as an example, the Minister representing in 
the Council of the Member State with which a particular OCT is connected 
is—as happens in numerous cases—also their (i.e. OCT-relevant) Minister. 
Moreover, when the inhabitants of the OCTs vote in the European 
Parliament elections,267 how is it possible to state that the provisions on the 
rules of formation and the powers of the EP do not apply to them? 
Moreover, the fact that, as the ECJ agreed, the courts of the OCTs can be 
regarded as courts or tribunals of a Member State in the sense of Article 267 
  
take into account not only the principles of Part IV TFEU, but also other principles of the 
Treaties). 
 262. Kochenov, supra note 29, at 209. 
 263. The EU’s Overseas will be increasingly integrated into the scope of EU law 
given the rapid rise in the importance of EU citizenship provisions for the construction of 
such scope. Dimitry Kochenov & Sir Richard Plender, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient 
Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, 37 Eur. L. Rev. (2012, 
forthcoming). 
 264. See Dimitry Kochenov, Regional Citizenships in the EU: An Example of the 
Åland Islands and New Caledonia, 35 Eur. L. Rev. 307 (2010). 
 265. Kochenov, supra note 29, at 211. 
 266. Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders 
van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 72. 
 267. For the analysis of the political rights of OCTs inhabitants with EU citizenship, 
see Kochenov, supra note 29, at 216. 
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TFEU (formerly Article 234 EC),268 which provides another argument for 
treating the position embraced by the ECJ with deep suspicion. Tout court, 
it is simply impossible to claim at this point that Part IV TFEU is the only 
part of the Treaties to apply to the OCTs, rhetoric notwithstanding. 
Crucially, asymmetry remains the main principle of association, which is 
entirely in line with the goals of association set out in Article 198 TFEU. 
In short, agreeing with Professor Ziller, while Part III TFEU does not 
apply in full, as the majority of derogations contained in Part IV TFEU 
actually concern the provisions of the mainstream acquis on the four 
freedoms and the Internal Market, other parts of the Treaties should be 
deemed to have at least potential legal effects with regard to the situation of 
the OCTs. Going even further along the path of the integrationalist vision of 
the OCTs, Dominique Custos is absolutely right that, notwithstanding the 
Part IV TFEU derogations, it is possible to speak of the application of the 
four freedoms to the OCTs,269 some of them virtually unrestrictedly.270  
IV. TERRITORIES SUI GENERIS IN THE EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS 
In addition to the ORs and OCTs, EU law applies in the most exceptional 
manner in a number of territories of the Member States not covered by these 
statuses. The situation of such territories, where profoundly atypical 
application of EU law is not based on Article 355(1) or (2) TFEU, is joined 
here in a category of sui generis territories. This group covers a number of 
territories where the degree of application of EU law varies from virtually 
full (territorial) non-application271 to significant inclusion into the scope of 
the acquis.272 
The legal regime of the application of the acquis to the sui generis 
territories is regulated by Article 355(3)–(5) TFEU, alongside the other 
primary law of the Union. The TFEU thus incorporates specific provisions 
limiting the application of EU law to the Channel Islands,273 the Isle of 
Man274 and the Åland Islands,275 and contains a list of the territories to 
which Community law does not apply, including the Færœ Islands276 and 
  
 268. Joined Cases C-100 & 101/89, Kaefer & Procacci v. French State, 1990 E.C.R. I-
4647, ¶¶ 7, 9-10; Broberg, supra note 11, at 138; Kochenov, supra note 3, at 253-54. 
 269. See Custos, supra note 11, at 108. 
 270. For detailed analysis of the application of specific areas of EU law in the 
Overseas, see EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 26. 
 271. E.g., the Færœ Islands. See TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 272. E.g., Gibraltar or the Åland Islands. See TFEU arts. 355(3) & (4). 
 273. TFEU art. 355(5)(c). 
 274. Id. 
 275. TFEU art. 355(4). 
 276. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). The Islands are willing to rethink their status. See Helena 
Spongenberg, Faroe Islands Seek Closer EU Relations, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 8, 2007), 
http://euobserver.com/24/24907. 
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the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (SBAs).277 Some relevant sections 
of Article 355 TFEU contain references to the specific provisions of the 
Acts of Accession, which entered into force at the moment of the accession 
to the Union of the Member States in charge of particular sui generis 
territories.278 However, a direct reference to the provisions of the Treaties of 
Accession limiting the extent to which the acquis applies in certain 
territories should not necessarily be contained in the TFEU, since the 
primary law status of such treaties is undisputed. Moreover, even failing to 
mention a territory in Article 355 TFEU directly does not exclude the 
possibility of a sui generis status for it. Examples of Gibraltar—which is 
covered by Article 355(3) TFEU—or the Holy Mount Athos—covered by a 
Declaration Appended to an Act of Accession279—are cases in point. 
The de facto disapplication of either particular elements or even the 
whole body of the acquis can also stem from the particular circumstances in 
which a Member State finds itself, especially when unable to exercise 
sovereignty over the whole state territory, which is the case of the Republic 
of Cyprus, for instance.280 The example of Cyprus is used more in the legal 
comparative vein, however, as it would be somewhat unjust to add the so-
called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on the list of the 
  
 277. TFEU art. 355(5)(b). The exceptional status of the Sovereign Base Areas is 
related to the non-economic nature of the British presence on Cyprus, as clarified in the Joint 
Declaration on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in Cyprus, appended to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38. For an 
analysis see, e.g., Stéphanie Lauhlé Shaelou, The Principle of Territorial Exclusion in the 
EU: SBAs in Cyprus—A Special Case of Sui Generis Territories in the EU, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 153. 
 278. The Treaties of Accession and Acts of Accession (making integral parts of the 
former) regulate the special status of Gibraltar. Accession to the European Communities of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 5 (First Accession Treaty); Spain and Portugal 
Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 25 (explaining that the Canary Islands and Ceuta and 
Melilla may be decided to be included the Community). 
  Protocols appended to the Acts of Accession also play an important role in the 
delimitation of the territorial scope of application of the Treaties. See, e.g., Protocols No. 2 & 
3 to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38; Protocol No. 2 to the 1985 Act of 
Accession Concerning the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla, Nov. 15, 1985, 1985 O.J. 
(L 302) 400; Protocol No. 3 on the Sami People, supra note 38. The same applies to the 
Declarations appended to the Acts of Accession. See, e.g., Joint Declaration on the Sovereign 
Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus, 
appended to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38; Declaration on Mount Athos, 
supra note 24.  
 279. Declaration on Mount Athos, supra note 24. 
 280. On the special position of the Cypriot territories not controlled by the 
government of Cyprus, see, for example, NIKOS SKOUTARIS, THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS IN A MEMBER STATE UNDER SIEGE (2011); STÉPHANIE LAULHÉ SHAELOU, THE EU 
AND CYPRUS: PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES OF FULL INTEGRATION (2010). 
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territories sui generis in the chosen sense of the term.281 Former examples of 
Hong Kong and Macao are equally not without interest.282 
All in all, the most important conclusion to be drawn from the very 
existence, as well as particular legal configuration of the modalities of sui 
generis application of the acquis in some Member States’ territories is that 
primary law of the Union provides enough flexibility for accommodating a 
broad array of far-reaching derogations, meeting the specific needs of those 
territories which are not satisfied with OR or OCT statuses. In other words, 
for the Member States it is theoretically possible to negotiate “in-between” 
statuses for specific territories virtually from scratch, should they be able to 
convince their other partners that there is sufficient need to deviate from the 
existing legal solutions.  
V. EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS AND OPT-OUTS AND DEROGATIONS FROM 
THE ACQUIS 
The derogations and opt-outs from the acquis are essential in shaping the 
legal essence of the special statuses granted to the Overseas in EU law. In 
fact, the EU Law of the Overseas is nothing but a law of derogations: it 
covers the special system of rules governing the adaptation of the familiar 
norms of the acquis to the specificities of the Overseas context. 
Assessed from this vantage point, OCT status can be regarded as a 
derogation in itself, as Jacques Ziller rightly noted,283 given that on the basis 
of Article 355(2) TFEU such countries and territories do not normally fall 
within the scope of EU law in its classical sense, as Part IV TFEU applies, 
supplying a derogatory lex specialis for the ordinary provisions of the 
acquis contained in Part III TFEU. 
The same can be said about all the sui generis statuses granted to 
Member States’ territories in EU law. The presumption is always absolutely 
clear: unless there is an unequivocal statement to the contrary, EU law, 
including the principle of the inclusive unitary interpretation of Member 
State territory, will be applicable to the whole of the territory of each of the 
Member States in full. In other words, even the total non-application of EU 
law, which can be witnessed in the context of some sui generis statuses, 
  
 281. Nikos Skoutaris, The Status of Northern Cyrus Under EU Law: A Comparative 
Approach to the Territorial Suspension of the Acquis, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra 
note 5, at 401.  
 282. For an analysis of the dubious legal position of Macao and Hong Kong in 
Community law before these territories were transferred to China (also differentiating 
between the sui generis statuses applicable to these territories), see Karagiannis, supra note 
19, at 338 n.26. See also Brian Hook & Miguel Santos Neves, The Role of Hong Kong and 
Macau in China’s Relations with Europe, 169 CHINA Q. 108 (2002). 
 283. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
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such as that enjoyed by the Færœ Islands,284 for instance, is still to be 
regarded as a derogation or opt-out granted in EU law. Such opt-outs are not 
unilateral and require the consent of all the Member States to address the 
staring presumption of the application of the acquis in full. 
Similarly, the OR status, even though it is rooted in the principle of the 
application of the acquis in the ORs, only acquires its meaning once 
derogations from the main principle are thoroughly considered. In fact, OR 
status has only acquired legal substance as a result of the articulation of the 
rules on how far and to what extent the acquis can be deviated from—which 
is the sole aim and purpose of Article 349 TFEU in the first place. The 
possibility to derogate is at the core of each of the statuses in question and 
forms the essence of the EU Law of the Overseas. 
In this context, a distinction should be made between the derogations in 
primary law, including total opt-outs, and derogations in secondary law. 
While the former can be permanent and it is up to the Member States to 
establish how far such derogations will actually go, the latter are quite 
different, as the approach to them is generally much stricter. Accordingly, 
following the Court’s case law, the reading of derogations should be as 
narrow as possible285 and their strict application should apply to the Member 
State subject to the derogation, other Member States286 and to the 
Institutions equally.287 These key attributes of derogations, whatever legal 
basis they have and whatever goals they are set out to achieve, remain 
largely intact also in the context of the Overseas. All derogations must 
deviate from the acquis as little as possible, and only as far as it is 
demonstrably necessary to achieve their specific goals. Moreover, they must 
be time-bound. There is thus no possibility of derogating from the acquis 
permanently under Article 349 TFEU, since, according to the Commission, 
the Treaty “does [not] provide a generalised ‘opt-out’ [for the ORs],”288 
which is a position also reflected in the ECJ’s Chevassus-Marche case 
law.289 
The nature of derogations may vary. In general, derogations can create 
legal consequences of different nature, depending on the type of the 
derogation in force. Four main types of derogations can be distinguished in 
this regard: opt-outs granted in the primary law of the Union (e.g. those 
included into the Treaty of Accession signed with an incoming Member 
State possessing special territories); dynamic derogations, rooted in primary 
  
 284. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 285. E.g., Case 58/83, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1984 E.C.R. 2027; Case 192/84, 
Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1985 E.C.R. 3967. 
 286. E.g., Case 77/82, Peskegloglou v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1983 E.C.R. 1085. 
 287. E.g., Case 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 207, ¶¶ 24-46. 
 288. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 31. 
 289. See generally Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la 
Réunion, 1998 E.C.R. I-743. 
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EU law, but essentially depending on the assessment of the situation in 
place in the regions enjoying a special status (e.g. when the Treaty of 
Accession allows for the broadening of the scope of derogations, or, on the 
contrary, narrowing their scope or shortening the time of applicability of 
derogations); derogations arising from secondary EU law and enabled by 
the use of the provisions on the special status of the Overseas as a legal 
basis (e.g. the ones contained in the Overseas Association Decisions and 
POSEI programmes); and derogations in secondary law not based on the 
special provisions in the Treaties on the Overseas, but de facto aiming to 
achieve objectives very similar or identical to those spelled out in the 
Overseas provisions. 
Opt-outs in primary law enjoy the most far-reaching effects among all 
the four types of derogations. They are capable of altering the very nature of 
the acquis applicable to a particular territory and—by virtue of being part of 
the Primary law—cannot be challenged in Court.290 The non-application of 
Part III TFEU in the OCTs, or the placement of the Færœ Islands outside 
the framework of the Treaties are good examples of such opt-outs. Unlike 
any other derogations, these are permanent: it takes a treaty revision to 
change them. 
Dynamic derogations in primary law function differently. They allow for 
the reassessment of the term of their validity upon expiry of a certain period 
contained in the derogating measure. The special legal regime applying to 
the Nordic territories inhabited by the Sami people, granted by virtue of 
Protocol No. 3 to the 1994 Act of Accession,291 illuminates how such 
derogations function. The Protocol established an ethnicity-based monopoly 
on the reindeer breeding in those regions,292 the extent of which can be 
altered in the future to exclude other traditional Sami activities from the 
scope of application of Community law, as long as it is deemed necessary 
for the preservation of their culture.293 An example of the same type of 
derogations applied in the context of the Overseas are the derogations 
contained in the Act of Accession that enlarged the Communities to 
incorporate the Iberian states, which allowed for the exclusion of the Canary 
Islands from the acquis and opened the way to reverse this position by 
Secondary law.294 Consequently, the Canary Islands were included into the 
  
 290. Joined Cases 31 & 35/86, Levantina Agricola Indus. SA (Laisa) & CPC España 
SA v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 2285,¶ 22. The Court can only interpret the provisions of the 
Treaties of Accession, Acts of Accession and Annexes to the Acts of Accession. See also, 
e.g., Case C-355/97, Landesgrundverkehrsreferent der Tiroler Landesregierung v. Beck 
Liegenschaftsverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, 1999 E.C.R. I-4977. On the practical 
functioning of such derogation in the context of the recent enlargement of the Union, see 
Dimitry Kochenov, European Integration and the Gift of the Second Class Citizenship, 13 
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 209 (2006). 
 291. See Perrot & Miatti, supra note 38, at 672-76. 
 292. Protocol No. 3 on the Sami People, supra note 38, art. 1. 
 293. Id. art. 2. See also Perrot & Miatti, supra note 38, at 674. 
 294. Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 25(4). 
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scope of EU law and the customs territory of the Union by Council 
Regulation 1911/91.295 This regulation started the process of integration of 
the Canary Islands into the EU and ultimately resulted in the grant of OR 
status to the Islands. 
Derogations in secondary law, based on the specific provisions in the 
Treaties on the Overseas, have a much more dynamic character than 
primary law opt-outs and derogations. In the context of the ORs, such 
derogations are based on the Council Decisions that have Article 349(1) 
TFEU as a legal basis, while in the context of the OCTs, such a special 
derogatory regime is established by Council Decisions adopted on the basis 
of Article 203 TFEU. The goals of such derogations would be to fully 
utilise the potential of the special statuses in question to meet the needs of 
the Overseas. Controversies can arise, with respect to the extent to which 
the Council can employ the special legal bases in the TFEU Treaty in 
derogating from the main rules of the acquis designed for each of the 
particular statuses in question. Interestingly, although neither Article 349(1) 
nor Article 203 TFEU spell out clear limits for Council action, a systemic 
reading of the Treaties along with the relevant case law makes it absolutely 
clear that those limits are there and that they should always be taken into 
account. Although the tension over the possible depth of derogations was 
somewhat relieved by Chevassus-Marche and other relevant cases in the 
context of the ORs, in the context of the OCTs such clarification is yet to 
come. Amusingly, the Overseas Association Decisions seem to derogate 
even from primary law, which is hardly acceptable. The strangest example 
is placing Bermuda, a British OCT included in Annex II TFEU, outside the 
scope of Association.296 The legality of this approach is very questionable 
indeed.297 Importantly, the derogations based on secondary law are not 
reshaping the essence of the acquis, like the primary law opt-outs, but are 
rooted in the spirit and the letter of the acquis itself, which indicates their 
different nature, compared with the first two types of derogations, and 
subordinates them vis-à-vis the primary law of the Union. 
Sometimes derogations of entirely different natures can be hardly 
distinguished from each other due to the similarities in the legal situations 
they create. The octroi de mer levied in the DOM thus used to have exactly 
the same practical consequences for the free-movement of goods as the 
arbitrio insular—tarifa especial levied by the Spanish authorities on the 
Canary Islands. However, due to their different nature, the legal status of the 
two taxes differed entirely. The French one was based on a Council 
  
 295. Council Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the 
Provisions of Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EEC). 
 296. See Council Decision 2001/822, On the Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories with the European Community, pmbl. para. 22, 2001 O.J. (L 314) 3 (EC). 
 297. E.g., Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 338-39 n. 27. 
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Decision adopted on the legal basis of the former Article 227(2) EEC298 and 
was thus an attempt to use a special legal basis provided in the EEC Treaty 
for the accommodation of the needs of the ORs. The Spanish one could be 
levied as part of a transitional regime applied to Spain following its 
accession to the EC and could remain in force until 31 December 2001.299 It 
was thus used to better prepare Spain for the eventual complete embrace of 
the acquis. Consequently, the Court could strike down300 and later adopt a 
milder position301 vis-à-vis the French tax, but the issue of the validity of a 
Spanish tax, which had identical implications for the free-movement of 
goods, could not even be raised before it. 
Not all the derogations aimed at meeting the special needs of the 
Overseas are based on the specific provisions designed for that purpose in 
the Treaties. This is particularly the case of the ORs. The use of multiple 
other legal bases both in Primary and Secondary EC law is possible. A 
virtually infinite number of examples can be provided, ranging from the 
rules on the operation of subsonic private jets,302 the definition of marine 
waters for the purposes of the marine environmental policy,303 to the 
regulation of electricity markets.304 What unites all the known examples is 
the link made between the derogation and the specificity of the region or 
territory overseas where such derogation applies. 
  
 298. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). The dock dues system 
presently in force is based on Council Decision 2004/162, of 10 February 2004 Concerning 
the Dock Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of 
Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64 (EC). This decision has EC Treaty art. 299(2) 
(now TFEU art. 349(1)) as a legal basis. 
 299. Protocol No. 2 of the Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 6. 
 300. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978. 
 301. See generally Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la 
Réunion, 1998 E.C.R. I-743. 
 302. Directive 2006/93/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the Regulation of the Operation of Aeroplanes Covered by Part II, 
Chapter 3, Volume 1 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Second 
Edition (1988), art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2 (codified version) (not applicable to DOM). 
 303. Directive 2008/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine 
Environmental Policy, art. 3(1), 2008 O.J. (L 164) 19, 24 (EC) (putting the DOM on equal 
footing with the OCTs). 
 304. See, e.g., Commission Decision 2004/920, On a Derogation from Certain 
Provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Archipelago of the Azores, 2004 O.J. (L 389) 31 (EC). The Derogation in 
question is based on Directive 2003/54/EC, Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/92/EC, art. 26(1), 2003 O.J. (L 176) 51. 
Commission Decision 2004/920/EC, pmbl. para. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 389) 31 (referencing the 
handicaps mentioned in EC Treaty art. 299(2) (as in effect 2002) (now TFEU art. 349). 
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All in all, the EU Law of the Overseas is clearly the law of derogations 
and should be regarded as such, the Overseas being firmly rooted in the 
letter and the spirit of the acquis unless the contrary is provided for. 
VI. CHANGING THE STATUS OF AN OVERSEAS REGION OR TERRITORY  
Having provided for two main legal statuses for the Overseas in addition 
to special accommodations for the sui generis territories, the Treaties 
obviously had to be able to accommodate the desire of particular overseas 
regions and territories to change status in EU law. That such change can be 
required is not an overstatement. Moreover, the order of importance of the 
status change will vary. Three different situations can be distinguished in 
this regard. 
The simplest among them concerns the reflection in the Treaties of the 
change in the constitutional structure of the Member State, which does not 
actually entail a status change for the particular territory in EU law. 
Therefore, when Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin became separate 
entities in French law,305 independent of the DOM Guadeloupe, it became 
necessary to have them included in the list of what is now Article 355(1) 
TFEU, even though their OR status was not at issue: after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, those territories simply became ORs in their 
own right. 
More interesting examples concern the change of the status of an 
overseas territory from OR to OCT or vice versa, driven by a belief that the 
new status will be better suited to guaranteeing the well-being of the 
population of the territory in question. Mayotte, a French OCT located 
between Madagascar and the African continent is currently on the way to 
OR status, to which end a special Declaration has been appended to the 
Treaty of Lisbon.306 Saint-Barthélemy, endowed with OR status upon 
splitting from Guadeloupe, demonstrated an intention to move in the 
opposite direction, towards the acquisition of OCT status.307 To provide 
another example, following the splitting of the Federation of the 
Netherlands Antilles, the so-called BES-eilanden (i.e. Bonaire, Sint-
Eustasius, and Saba) ended up incorporated within the constitutional 
structure of the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which 
could eventually result in pressure to change status from the current OCT to 
OR too.308 Currently, it has been decided to wait five years before reopening 
  
 305. See, e.g., André Oraison, Le statut nouveau de collectivité d’outre-mer des îles de 
Saint-Barthélemy et de Saint-Martin, in REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC, 154 (2008). 
 306. Declaration No. 43 on Article 355(6) of the TFEU, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 351. See 
also its predecessor, Declaration on Article IV-440(7), appended to the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 463 (never ratified) [hereinafter TCE]. 
 307. Oraison, supra 305, at 164. 
 308. Discussions to this end are ongoing. See, e.g., Hoogers, supra note 107; F.H. van 
den Brug, De BES-eilanden van buiten de Europese Unie naar binnen de Europese Unie 
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the issue.309 Such status change requires a lot of preparation, since the legal 
position of an OR, where the acquis applies by default, is quite different 
from that of an OCT, where derogations constitute the main rule. 
Consequently, the territories willing to undergo the change need to be 
adequately prepared for what lies ahead.310 The same can be said about 
changing from OR to OCT status, however. The challenges here are 
different, since the territory in question will need to be capable of handling 
a greater measure of autonomy in EU law and thus needs to be adequately 
prepared for the responsibilities and the challenges accompanying a greater 
degree of self-government. 
It can also be foreseen that a third, more complicated type of status 
change might also become an issue in the near future—moving the Overseas 
not currently subject to EU law within the realm of the acquis, or moving 
ORs or OCTs into the group of the territories sui generis. This could even 
result in the creation of new legal statuses for the Overseas in EU law. The 
possibilities for the creation of new, mixed-bag legal regimes are clearly 
foreseeable and virtually infinite. With the entry of Iceland into the EU, it 
can be expected that the Færœ Islands (a sui generis territory where EU law 
does not apply)311 and possibly Greenland (an OCT included in Annex II 
TFEU), would decide to amend their status in EU law, which might be 
required to meet the challenge of the changes in the fisheries regime 
applicable to Iceland after its accession. 
The Treaties regard such situations differently. The difference in 
approach does not only depend on the type of the status change in question, 
but also on the Member State with which a particular overseas region or 
territory is connected. Two Articles are applicable in this respect. Lex 
generalis is provided by Article 48 TEU, which contains a description of the 
procedures for Treaty amendment. Given that the subject matter of the 
status change of the Overseas is not covered by Article 48(6) TEU, 
simplified revision procedures outlined by Article 48 TEU are not 
applicable in this case, and the ordinary revision procedure applies.312 Lex 
  
[The BES Islands from Outside the European Union Within the European Union], 24 
REGELMAAT 230 (2009). See, e.g., H.G. Hoogers et al., Staatsrechtelijke consequenties van 
de toekenning van een UPG-status aan Aruba en de Eilandgebieden van de huidige 
Nederlandse Antillen, 26 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT—JUSTICIA (2010) (Neth.) 
for an analysis of the constitutional consequences of a more global shift from the OCT to the 
OR status among the Netherlands Overseas. 
 309. Hoogers, supra note 107, at 6. 
 310. A good example of the depth of the preparation required is the gradual change of 
the law of Mayotte, done in preparation to making it an OR in EU law. See, e.g., MINOM 
DAESC AE DEU, Evolution du Statut Européen de Mayotte en RUP (June 16, 2004) 
(unpublished document) (on file with the author). See also Hugues Béringer, 
Departementalisation de Mayotte: Un changement de regime statutaire aix enjeux 
internationaux, 2 in REVUE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE 176 (2010). 
 311. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 312. TEU art. 48(2)–(5).  
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specialis, concerning a possibility of simplified status change via a Decision 
of the European Council is contained in Article 355(6) TFEU and only 
applies to “amending the status, with regard to the Union, of a Danish, 
French, or Netherlands country or territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 
2.”313 Given that Article 355(1) and (2) refers to the ORs and the OCTs, the 
ordinary Treaty amendment procedure will not apply to the Danish, French, 
and Netherlands Overseas wishing to amend status in line with the first two 
categories of status change outlined above—which includes the conferral of 
a particular status in its own right on a territory already enjoying such a 
status via affiliation with a larger entity, such as the grant of OR status to 
Saint-Martin on its split from Guadeloupe, which is also an OR—or moving 
a territory from one status to another. 
Whether the third type of status change outlined above would be covered 
by Article 355(6) TFEU is not entirely clear. Given that the provision 
allows for “amending the status, with regard to the Union,”314 it can be 
concluded that such a possibility exists. In other words, a simplified 
procedure for Article 355(6) TFEU can even be used to create new, sui 
generis statuses in EU law—and no formal Treaty amendment in line with 
Article 48 TEU would be required.315 
The reach of such lex specialis is limited in two respects, however. 
Firstly, geographically, the Spanish, Portuguese and British Overseas cannot 
benefit from Article 355(6) TFEU and are bound to rely on lex generalis—
i.e. an ordinary treaty amendment procedure—in all the situations involving 
a change of a status of such territories with regard to EU law, including 
even the simplest ones. Secondly, since the simplified status change 
procedure only applies to the current OCT and ORs, it is impossible to 
employ this procedure to change the status of a Member State region or 
territory even if they are referred to in Article 355(6) TFEU, if such a region 
or territory does not fall within the two statuses. Consequently, while the 
simplified procedure might enable Greenland to amend its status in EU law, 
it is not applicable to the Færœ Islands, which, although Danish, enjoy a sui 
generis status under Article 355(5)(a) and are thus not covered. 
Needless to say, the differences between the two procedures are truly 
fundamental to say the least. While it is abundantly clear after a number of 
negative referenda and in a situation where the number of the Member 
  
 313. TFEU art. 355(6). For analysis Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries 
and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 78; Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le 
traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 736-39. This provision is rooted in TCE art. IV-440, 
which never entered into force.  
 314. TFEU art. 355(6). 
 315. Danielle Perrot shares this position: “[TFEU art. 355(6)] n’exclut nullement que 
puisse être donné une suite juridique à une volonté politique de forger un statut encore 
inédit.” Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra 
note 27, at 736. 
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States is only growing, that amending the Treaties will not become any 
easier in the years to come, recourse to an ordinary treaty amendment 
procedure can potentially be problematic. This is exactly the problem that 
Article 355(6) TFEU—inserted into the treaties by the Lisbon 
amendment—was intended to solve (for the ORs and the OCTs connected 
with some Member States at least). Puzzlingly, the Treaties do not make 
any reference to the democratic principles behind such status changes.316 
Faithful to the language of the primary law of the Union, it is only possible 
to wonder at how not a single word about the will of the people inhabiting 
the territories concerned entered the Treaty of Lisbon provision. 
Comparing the procedures, while Article 355(6) TFEU requires a 
unanimous decision of the European Council, with Commission 
consultation, on a proposal from the Member State connected with the 
territory subjected to the status change, Article 48 TEU is full of procedural 
complications and requires the involvement of a huge number of actors, the 
convening of a Convention “composed of representatives of the national 
Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of 
the European Parliament and of the Commission,”317 as well as the 
Conference of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
(IGC),318 the signing of the new Treaty by all the Member States and its 
ratification in accordance with their respective national constitutional 
requirements.319 It should be quite clear at this point that the employment of 
Article 48 TEU is not easy at all. At the same time, there is no obligation to 
draft a separate amending Treaty for every change in status of each overseas 
territory. The relevant changes can be made in the course of an IGC having 
a much broader mandate, thus becoming part of a somewhat more 
encompassing Treaty amendment procedure. 
  
 316. The Kingdom of the Netherlands appended a special Declaration to the Treaty of 
Lisbon in order to remedy this deficiency in the context of the eventual change in the EU 
legal status of one of its OCTs. See Declaration by the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 
Article 55 of the on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 
358. See also its predecessor, Kingdom of the Netherlands on Article IV-440, appended to 
the TCE, supra note 303 (never entered into force). 
 317. TEU art. 48(3). 
 318. TEU art. 48(4). 
 319. TEU art. 48(4), para. 2. 
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Before the inclusion of Article 355(6) TFEU into the Treaties by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,320 Treaty amendment was the only way to change a status 
of an overseas territory or region of a Member State vis-à-vis EU law, 
which can be illustrated by the change of the status of the Netherlands 
Antilles, 321 Greenland,322 or, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the update of the 
ORs list to include Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin. Consequently, 
unilateral action by a Member State cannot possibly lead to a change in the 
legal status of an overseas region or territory in EU law.323 
  
 320. Such provision was actually first included in the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe which, however, never entered into force. See TCE art. IV-440(7). 
For an analysis see, for example, Jacques Ziller, Les collectivités des outre-mer de l’Union 
européenne, in L’OUTRE-MER FRANÇAIS: LA NOUVELLE DONNE INSTITUTIONNELLE 105–114 
(Jean Yves Faberon ed., 2004). For the general analysis of the likely influence of the TCE in 
the context of the Overseas, see Nadége Damoiseau, La portée du projet de Traité européen 
pour les DOM/ROM, 42 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN [RTDE] 649 (2006). 
 321. See de Overeenkomst tot wijziging van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschap ten einde de bijzondere associeatieregeling van het 
vierde deel van het Verdrag op de Nederlandse Antillen te doen zijn, of 13 November 1962, 
1964 J.O. (2413) 64.  
 322. See Greenland Treaty, Mar. 13, 1984, 1985 O.J. (L 29) 1. See also Weiss, supra 
note 84, at 173-75; Hylke Dijkstra et al., The European Union as an Actor in Arctic 
Governance, 16 EUR. F. AFF. REV. 227 (2011). 
 323. See also Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 719; The “seemingly illegal” example of Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon is the only precedent known today of an attempt at a unilateral change of a status 
of a territory by a Member State. Ziller, supra note 11, at 120. This territory, lying off the 
North-Eastern coast of Canada, was unilaterally proclaimed by France to have changed its 
status from an OCT to an OR (a status entirely reserved for the French DOM at the time, 
following the independence of Algeria) since it became a DOM in French law in 1976. 
France assumed that being a DOM in national law was enough to qualify as a DOM in the 
sense of EEC art. 227(2) (then in force), which made a general reference to the constitutional 
status of such territories in French law, instead of naming them all, which the Treaty of 
Lisbon has introduced. Consequently, according to the French, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon held 
the DOM status in the sense of national law and, also, in the sense of Community law until 
1985 when a reverse switch occurred, making it an OCT again. A number of French legal 
scholars assumed that such a change had legal effects in Community law. Coussirat-
Coustère, supra note 82, at 1425 n.28. The study of the Community documents demonstrates, 
however, that Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon was, in fact, treated as an OCT, not as an OR during 
its short-lived “éphémère période départementale” between 1976 and 1985. Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 151. Therefore, it was not made part of the 
customs territory of the Community, which can be regarded a necessary element of the OR 
status. Moreover, it has always been mentioned in the Annex to the EEC Treaty listing the 
associated countries and territories (now TFEU Annex II). Nevertheless, in an answer to a 
written question, the Commission stated unequivocally that it was covered by the status of 
EEC art. 227(2), i.e., that it was in fact an OR. See Written Question No. 400/76 by Mr. 
Lagorce to the Commission Concerning the Situation of the Islands Saint-Pierre-and-
Miquelon, 1976 O.J. (C 294) 16 [hereinafter Written Question by Mr. Lagorce]. The fact that 
it was not treated as one in Community law is indicative of the fact that de facto the change 
of status has never occurred. The Treaty of Lisbon made the repetition of such 
misunderstandings impossible, since from the date of its entry into force no connection is 
made between the legal status of an overseas territory or region in national law of the 
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VII. THE FUTURE OF EU OVERSEAS LAW 
Upon an overview of the essential principles and instruments affecting 
the legal regime of the Overseas, a contradictory picture emerges. On one 
hand, the Treaties unquestionably recognise the innate specificity of these 
regions compared with the Member States’ territories lying in the European 
continent—where the acquis applies in full—and provide for a clear 
demarcation of three legal statuses to be awarded to such regions in EU law. 
On the other hand, from the analysis presented above, it is clear that the 
essential content of the legal statuses in question is very fluid and can 
largely overlap from one status to another. Although the starting principles 
currently governing the operation of EU law in each of the three legal 
regimes analysed are very different, according to the Treaties and to the 
case law of the Court, the analysis of the practical consequences of the 
application of these differences shows that, in some fields at least, these 
differences can be truly negligible. The problematic nature of this state of 
affairs should not be overstated, however. Given the profound discrepancies 
between the conditions of particular Overseas, whatever category they fall 
in, flexibility, also within EU Law of the Overseas, is to be regarded as an 
essential and necessary principle. In fact, all the relevant law can be 
reinterpreted in this light—the special legal statuses for the Overseas were 
created for no other reason than for ensuring the maximum level of flexible 
application of law in these regions, to adjust the acquis optimally to make it 
suit their needs. Which starting assumption is adopted in this respect—i.e. 
whether it be the application of EU law in full with possible far-reaching 
derogations, or a general exclusion from the scope of the Internal Market 
law, again, with far-reaching derogations—ultimately changes little, if not 
nothing. These are simply two sides of the same coin and have to be 
regarded as such.  
The story of the Overseas in the EU is a story of constant readjustment of 
their legal position. In essence a circular move can be observed in this 
respect. Having started as a potentially key element of the Eurafrican 
project, the Overseas that remained connected to the Member States upon 
the finalization of decolonization largely fell into oblivion and lost any 
relevance whatsoever in the eyes of the Union, except for the constant 
refrain about their “under-development” and “handicaps.” No distinction is 
to be made between the OCTs and the ORs in this respect, since both have 
enjoyed the same treatment. The situation seems to be changing at the 
moment, however, as the Commission and other Institutions have started 
paying greater attention to the Overseas, recognizing their potential.324 The 
  
Member State with which they are connected and EU law, making the claims that one should 
follow another untenable. 
 324. E.g., Communication from the Commission on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity 
by 2010—and Beyond: Sustaining Ecosystem Services for Human Well-being, COM (2006) 
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circle is thus rounding; hopefully, the Overseas will regain their initial 
importance in the eyes of the Union, which will benefit all the three sides 
involved: the EU, the Member States and, of course, the Overseas 
themselves. In addition to this welcome circular move, the dynamics of the 
Overseas’ law development over recent decades permits the outlining of 
four profoundly interrelated trends affecting the legal situation of the 
Overseas in the Union. 
The first trend concerns the gradual rise in attention paid to the needs of 
the Overseas, as well as clearer articulation of their statuses, allowing a 
substantial increase in flexibility. Although the ECJ can clearly be criticized 
for embracing a somewhat limiting approach to the two main Overseas 
statuses—which can be exemplified by Lancry325 and Antillean Rice 
Mills326—ultimately the Court undoubtedly played a leading role in the 
articulation of the legal specificity of the Overseas, using those limited 
opportunities which arose to clarify their status. In fact, before Hansen,327 
the distinction between the ORs and the OCTs, which is stated in the 
Treaties quite clearly, was virtually ignored in practice, so it is due to the 
Court that the current statuses took shape in an atmosphere of waning 
interest on the part of the Member States and the Institutions. Now that the 
Commission has joined in with its recent Papers,328 the situation is changing 
for the better for the Overseas and promises due attention in future, as well 
as clarity of status and better opportunities for development in a situation 
where their specificity is duly recognised. 
The second trend in the evolution of the EU Law of the Overseas is the 
gradual rise in the flexibility of the reading of the essential elements of each 
of the legal statuses concerned. It is now abundantly clear to the Institutions, 
and most importantly, the Court, that the status of an OR or an OCT is 
unlikely to be productive if construed too rigidly. Moving away from 
rigidity in the framing of these statuses is to be witnessed at all the three 
relevant levels of legal-political regulation. This is happening at the policy 
level, with the Commission unequivocally recognizing the need for the 
special treatment of the Overseas in its recent policy documents; at the level 
of law-making (including primary law) where each Treaty revision has 
added more subtlety to the legal construction of the Overseas, to which the 
removal of the list of the “untouchable” areas of the acquis from the 
  
216 final (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Communication on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity]; 
Commission Green Paper, supra note 29. 
 325. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978. 
 326. See Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 
37. 
 327. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787. 
 328. E.g., Communication on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity, supra note 324; 
Commission Green Paper, supra note 29. 
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relevant Article in Amsterdam329 is a great illustration; and also at the level 
of interpreting the law, where the Court embraced OR flexibility, going far 
beyond what had previously been seemingly permitted in the Chevassus-
Marche line of case law,330 as well as recognized the influence on the 
OCTs’ acquis from different sources, ranging from the general principles of 
EU law to EU citizenship.331 As a result of the recent reshuffling of the way 
the Overseas are regarded in EU law, the legal regimes in question became 
much better suited to the full reflection of the specificity of the regions 
concerned. 
It became clear, at the same time, that the special legal regimes created 
for the Overseas in the Treaties recognize many more limitations than 
initially thought, which forms the third notable trend in the development of 
the EU Overseas law. Being essentially territorial in nature, the special 
clauses in the Treaties dealing with the Overseas are powerless in the face 
of the penetration of EU law via other routes, especially the scope ratione 
personae, which has received a notable boost with the articulation of the 
importance of the concept of EU citizenship by the ECJ during the last ten 
years.332 Although the inherent limitations of the territorial logic of all the 
derogations marking the legal situation of the Overseas in the Treaties can 
be regarded favourably, given that EU citizens residing there are not always 
affected by such limitations and can, as a consequence, invoke EU law on 
some occasions even when residing largely outside the scope ratione loci of 
EU law—to of which Eman and Sevinger333 is a perfect illustration334—this 
development can also have a negative side to it, since it limits the extent of 
possible derogations from the mainstream acquis in the Overseas, thus 
undermining the very rationale for the creation of the special statuses. This 
mostly concerns the OCTs, of course, but can also become acute in the OR 
context, since the rights of EU citizenship not connected to territory can 
potentially come into conflict with the special derogatory regime of the 
application of EU law in such regions. The same largely also applies to the 
  
 329. EC Treaty art. 227(2). 
 330. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743. See also Joined Cases C-37 & 38/96, Sodiprem SARL & Others v. Direction 
Générale des Douanes, 1998 E.C.R. I-2039. 
 331. Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders 
van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055. 
 332. See, e.g., Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691; Case C-
200/02, Zhu v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925; See generally Case C-
192/05, K. Tas-Hagen and R.A. Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en 
Uitkeringsraad, 2006 E.C.R. I-10451; Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R.I-
1449. For an analysis see Kochenov & Plender, supra note 263; Dimitry Kochenov, Ius 
Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status 
and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169 (2009). 
 333. See generally Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en 
Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055. 
 334. See Kochenov, supra note 29. 
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sui generis statuses.335 All in all, the last ten years have demonstrated that 
the derogatory essence of the Overseas’ legal regime in EU law should not 
be overstated, as its territorial nature competes with other scopes of EU law, 
the latter not acknowledging any exceptional statuses for the Overseas. 
Taking all the aforementioned aspects marking the evolution of the legal 
position of the Overseas in the Union together, the fourth trend worth 
mentioning emerges. It concerns the on-going convergence in the essence of 
the majority of the legal statuses demarcated by Article 355 TFEU. In other 
words, considering the effects of the rise in the flexibility coupled with the 
effects of the rising awareness of the limitations inherent in the territorial 
logic marking the essence of Article 355 TFEU, as well as the willingness 
of the Institutions to do more in connection with meeting the needs of the 
Overseas related to their special position, all act to blur the border between 
the OCTs and the ORs. This development should not be lamented and could 
even probably be predicted, given the stunning diversity observable from 
one EU overseas region or territory to another. Consequently, it is not 
surprising in the slightest that the main legal framework designed to cater 
for the needs of the Overseas demands increasingly flexible approaches to 
achieve its stated goals, even if the result of such evolution tends to 
undermine the crisp distinction set out in the initial design of the legal 
regime of the Overseas in EU law. 
Accordingly, approaching all the special legal statuses created for the 
Overseas in the EU separately, and viewing the Overseas in isolation from 
the mainstream acquis and other, non-territorial, scopes of EU law except 
ratione loci, is currently impossible. An integrated approach to the Overseas 
in the EU is indispensable in studying the legal aspects of the EU’s 
Overseas.  
In the context of the main trends in the development of the EU Law of 
the Overseas, a number of important questions arise, signposting the likely 
evolution of this branch in the near future. The most important foundational 
question in this context is related to the need to repeatedly find the right 
balance between integration and differentiation. Undoubtedly, it equally 
concerns all the known types of the Overseas in EU law. A number of 
related issues emerge, involving the necessity to pay due attention to the 
actual needs of the Overseas when derogating from the acquis, to take into 
account the main rationale and principles of European integration and EU 
citizenship when framing the Overseas acquis, and to avoid post-colonialist 
attitudes in EU–Overseas interactions. 
  
 335. For an analysis focusing especially on the potential influence of EU citizenship 
on the law of the Åland Islands see Kochenov, supra note 37. 
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Location Capital Surface 
Area 
Population 
























Madeira Portugal Atlantic Funchal 795 
km2
244.800 














France Caribbean Marigot 53 km2 35.000 
 








Åland Islands Finland Baltic Mariehamn 13.517 27.700 
Færœ Islands Denmark North Atlantic Tórshavn 1.399 48.917 
Gibraltar United 
Kingdom 








Isle of Man United 
Kingdom 















Mediterranean Episkopi 254 14.500 
 











Caribbean The Valley 91 11.430 
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Aruba Netherlands Caribbean Oranjestad 180 90.508 
Bermuda United 
Kingdom 
Atlantic Hamilton 53 62.059 





















Caribbean Road Town 153 27.000 





Curaçao Netherlands Caribbean Willemstad 444 142.180 
Falkland Islands United 
Kingdom 















Greenland Denmark Arctic Nuuk 2.166.0 56.452 
Mayotte France Indian 
Ocean 









France Pacific Nouméa 18.575 249.000 
Pitcairn United 
Kingdom 
Pacific Adamstown 47 50 
Saba Netherlands Caribbean The Bottom 13 2.000 
Saint-
Barthélémy 
France Caribbean Gustavia 25 8.300 




Atlantic Jamestown 122 4.255 
Saint-Pierre- et-
Miquelon 
France Atlantic Saint-Pierre 242 7.063 
Sint Eustasius Netherlands Caribbean Oranjestad 21 3.100 






















France Pacific Mata-Utu 264 15.289 
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TABLE 4: KEY PROVISIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATUS OF THE 
OVERSEAS: PRE-LISBON AND LISBON VERSIONS COMPARED.336 
 
TFEU EC Treaty 
Article 203 (formerly Article 187 EC) 
 
The Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall, on the 
basis of the experience acquired under the 
association of the countries and territories with 
the Union and of the principles set out in the 
Treaties, lay down provisions as regards the 
detailed rules and the procedure for the 
association of the countries and territories with 
the Union. Where the provisions in question 
are adopted by the Council in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure, it shall act 
unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament.  
Article 187 (formerly Article 136) 
 
The Council, acting unanimously, 
shall, on the basis of the experience 
acquired under the association of 
the countries and territories with the 
Community and of the principles 
set out in this Treaty, lay down 
provisions as regards the detailed 
rules and the procedure for the 
association of the countries and 
territories with the Community. 
 
Article 349 
(formerly Article 299(2), second, third and 
fourth subparagraphs, EC) 
 
Taking account of the structural social and 
economic situation of Guadeloupe, French 
Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-
Barthélémy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands, which is compounded 
by their remoteness, insularity, small size, 
difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence 
and combination of which severely restrain 
their development, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, shall adopt specific 
measures aimed, in particular, at laying down 
the conditions of application of the Treaties to 
those regions, including common policies. 
Where the specific measures in question are 
adopted by the Council in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure, it shall also act 
on a proposal from the Commission and after 




The measures referred to in the first paragraph 
concern in particular areas such as customs 




2. [ . . . ] However, taking account 
of the structural social and 
economic situation of the French 
overseas departments, the Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands, 
which is compounded by their 
remoteness, insularity, small size, 
difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on a few 
products, the permanence and 
combination of which severely 
restrain their development, the 
Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament, shall 
adopt specific measures aimed, in 
particular, at laying down the 
conditions of application of the 
present Treaty to those regions, 
including common policies. 
 
 
The Council shall, when adopting 
the relevant measures referred to in 
  
 336. Emphasis indicates changes in wording other than mere change in style. Ziller, 
Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into 
Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 86-88. 
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and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, 
agriculture and fisheries policies, conditions for 
supply of raw materials and essential consumer 
goods, State aids and conditions of access to 







The Council shall adopt the measures referred 
to in the first paragraph taking into account the 
special characteristics and constraints of the 
outermost regions without undermining the 
integrity and the coherence of the Union legal 
order, including the Internal Market and 
common policies. 
the second subparagraph, take into 
account areas such as customs and 
trade policies, fiscal policy, free 
zones, agriculture and fisheries 
policies, conditions for supply of 
raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural 
funds and to horizontal Community 
programmes. 
 
The Council shall adopt the 
measures referred to in the second 
subparagraph taking into account 
the special characteristics and 
constraints of the outermost regions 
without undermining the integrity 
and the coherence of the 
Community legal order, including 
the Internal Market and common 
policies. 
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